INNOVATION Exchange



A publication describing innovations and implementations in law enforcement, crime prevention and corrections

Naomi Shapira – Editor

Nahum Steigman – Translation

Judith Rudman – Copy Editor

Studio Mira Kedar – Graphics

Photography – Spokesman's Office, Israel Prison Service;
Communications Div., Community & Civil Guard Dept., Israel Police

Maor Wallach Ltd. – Color Separation, Plates and Printing

Innovation Exchange
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

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FROM THE EDITOR

NAOMI SHAPIRA

Dear Readers,

A decision by the Israel Cabinet in 1974 transferred responsibility for the country's internal security from the armed forces to the police. All the years that have passed since then have proved that the added responsibility came at the expense of the existing one, conventional policing on behalf of law-abiding citizens. The outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada in October 2000 has made things even worse. Internal security has become the Israel Police's consuming preoccupation, drawing away a large part of the manpower and material resources that should be going into the investigation of crime.

Then came September 11th, and the dramatic events around the world since those attacks have made terrorism a strategic enemy of world peace. The threat terrorism now holds over us, over individual nations and the international community alike, is compelling us all to find ways to meet the same critical long-term challenges to law enforcement, security and public order. Several papers in this issue will deal, therefore, with the terrorist threat and with the long-term battle against it that Israel is being forced to wage.

Naomi Shapira
Editor

THE MINISTER'S PRIZE FOR RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 2001: RATIONING CELLULAR PHONE TIME

NAOMI SHAPIRA – HEAD, DIVISION OF INFORMATION SERVICES,
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY

The Minister's Prize for Research and Development for 2001 has been awarded to two communications officers from Lakhish Police District, Superintendents Moshe Weiss and Roman Buchunenski (the latter an officer in the District's communications laboratory), for developing a device which automatically cuts off every outgoing call made to a cellular phone after five minutes. Until now, a 10-minute time limit had been imposed, but the new device, an electronic circuit installed at the switchboard, automatically cuts off the call after half that time, forcing officers to talk more economically.

The virtues of the new device are many: it is simple to operate, it is easy and cheap to manufacture and install, and it saves huge amounts of money. Israel Police (IP) financial managers are already singing its praises, calculating the amount lopped off the IP phone bill so far at over a hundred thousand dollars.

Today's World: Terrorism

YIZKOR - IN MEMORIAM

Over the two years that have now passed since the outbreak of the "Al Aksa" intifada, the Israel Police has stood day by day in the line of fire.
Twenty-seven of its men and women have paid with their lives in terrorist attacks, scores more have been seriously injured, and hundreds have "escaped" with lesser wounds.
In truth, the IP's officers are Israel's human body-armor.

May we the people of Israel remember and never allow ourselves to forget their devotion and self-sacrifice, their courage and valor, and the example their lives have set for us all.

Chief Inspector Yosef Tabeja
Corporal Madchat Yosef
Staff Sergeant Major Jonathan Vermulen
Corporal Tzachi David
Sergeant Andre Zaledkin
Volunteer Aharon Ussishkin
Senior Staff Sergeant Major Yoel Binnenfeld
Advanced Staff Sergeant Major Ahmad Mazareeb
Sergeant Major Galit Arbiv
Superintendent Moshe Dayan
Staff Sergeant Major Saleem Barakat
Sergeant Major Constantin Danilov
Lance Corporal Mordechai Tomer
Superintendent Patrick Pereg
Chief Inspector Ya'akov Azoulai
Lance Corporal Keren Franco
Sergeant David Smirnof
Corporal Uriel Bar-Maimon
Lance Corporal Noa Shlomo
Sergeant Tomer Nov
Chief Superintendent Samih Sweidan
Staff Sergeant Netanel Machluf
Sergeant Gad Rahamim
Sergeant Esther Pesachov
Staff Sergeant Aiman Sharuf
Staff Sergeant Liat Ben Ami
Sergeant Moshe Hezkiyah

THE STRATEGY OF MODERN TERRORISM

BOAZ GANOR – DIRECTOR, THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY INSTITUTE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM AT THE INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER, HERZLIYA

Terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and indeed political violence in general, have accompanied mankind from the dawn of history to this very day. Over the years, they have changed in appearance and form — operating methods have been altered, targets for attack have changed, as have the political goals and the identity of the perpetrators. However, as a rule, the principle of deliberately using violent means against civilians in order to achieve political objectives has been preserved.

The Development of Modern Terrorism

In the past, terrorists tried to influence decision-makers and their policies through a policy known as individualized terrorism — political assassinations and other direct action against government personnel. The assassinations were an effective means — particularly in authoritarian regimes — to replace government leaders and bring about change in policy. However, due both to the process of modernization and to the spread of democracy, violent political organizations have had to adapt their tactics to a changing environment. Rather than acting against policy-makers directly, they began to focus on pressuring public opinion and spreading fear among citizens with the aim of achieving their political objectives.

This type of terrorism — indiscriminate terrorism — owes its development to a number of technological innovations, which, in the twentieth century, provided fruitful ground for the spread of modern terrorism. Modern terrorism grew in step with the development of innovative weapons and modern means of transportation. Innovations in weapons technology has made lethal weapons smaller and more portable, and much more difficult to detect. Mass transportation has become faster, yet more vulnerable. Commercial air transport has come to be seen as the "soft underbelly" of the transport industry, offering many opportunities for attack by terrorists, while by the same token, providing a swift means of escape for perpetrators of attacks. But most of all, modern terrorism has profited from the development and spread of modern mass media, and electronic communication in

particular. Of foremost importance is television. The facility for live broadcasts and the transfer of information in real time, and in color, via satellite all over the world, along with the multiplicity of communications channels — and the competition among them — have provided modern terrorists with useful tools for "selling their message". They can carry out horrific attacks and transmit their message to the general public with great speed and emphasis. The spread of liberal, democratic values — freedom of expression, freedom of organization, the right to individual self-determination, and the emphasis on the value of human life — have also influenced the development and characteristics of terrorists' activities. When forced to deal with terrorism, liberal-democratic countries actually find themselves facing an almost impossible dilemma: on the one hand they are obligated to safeguard the security and well being of their citizens; on the other hand, they must preserve the democratic values and universal humane values on which they are predicated. Taking stern steps against those who perpetrate acts of terrorism and their commanders could be harmful to the values of democracy, while diligently maintaining the values of democracy could lead to the continuation of terrorist attacks, to public anger, and, eventually, to the rise of a dictatorship that promises "to put an end to terrorism once and for all". The democratic states must therefore find the golden mean, acting effectively against terrorist organizations, without harming democratic values.

The Media

Much has been said about the connection between terrorism and the media. There are those who claim that indiscriminate terrorism could not have come into the world without media coverage, or at least could not have reached such serious proportions. There is, at any rate, a close reciprocal relationship between terrorist organizations and the media; the terrorist organizations need the media to broadcast their opinions, to influence public opinion, and to sow fear and anxiety among the public. The media, meanwhile, thrives on events that captivate the public, sell newspapers, and raise the ratings of broadcasting stations.

Modern terrorism, as opposed to classical terrorism, does not aim to influence decision-makers directly, the way the old individualized terrorism did, by liquidation of leaders, or by direct threats against opponents. Modern terrorism indiscriminately targets civilians, in order to convey the message to TV viewers and newspaper readers that the danger of terrorism is lying in wait for them — that they may well be the next victims.

In national terms, the physical damage from a single terrorist attack is usually relatively small (in comparison, for example, with road accidents), but the damage to public morale is heavier in the case of a terrorist attack. Terrorist organizations have assigned the media a key role in increasing this damage. Aware of the importance of media coverage, terrorists direct their activities in such a way as to attract maximum media attention. The location and type of attack, its character, its timing, and the way in which responsibility is claimed are all given careful consideration to ensure maximum coverage.

In their efforts to ensure media coverage, terrorist organizations sometimes choose to carry out attacks at events attended by a high concentration of media. Abu Iyyad, Yasser Arafat's former deputy, explained that the

decision to carry out the attack at the Munich Olympics was taken in order "*to exploit the extraordinary concentration of mass media in Munich to give our struggle international reverberations — whether positive or negative, it didn't matter*". [Emphasis added.]

Sometimes organizations invite the media to the site of an attack or demand press interviews during a hostage situation. In a few cases around the world, terrorist organizations have taken over radio and television stations with the aim of forcing them to pass on the terrorists' message to the public.

The strategy of modern terrorism is supported by the existence and activity of the electronic and written media. A terrorist attack is aimed, first and foremost, at the media. It is intended to draw the attention of journalists — to grab news headlines or television airtime. Media exposure is supposed to transmit the terrorist organization's message to the general public, inspire fear and anxiety among citizens, and put pressure on decision-makers to give in to the terrorists' demands. This method of operation runs like a crimson thread through the activities of most terrorist organizations around the world, no matter what their political goals.

Upholding Public Morale in the Face of Terrorism

Terrorism is a kind of psychological warfare — an attack on the public morale. By means of indiscriminate attacks, the terrorist organizations seek to swing the balance of public interest — to instill in the citizens of the targeted state the belief that the most important thing is to stop the terrorist attacks, that this outweighs any other political interest. The terrorist message is that only by appeasing the terrorist organization and acceding to its demands, can the attacks be halted.

Through the terrorist attack, the organization aspires to transmit different messages to different target communities at the same time. To its own constituent population and supporters, the organization's message is intended to raise morale. To the targeted population, the message aims to lower morale and undermine the will to resist. As for the rest of the world — those not directly affected by the terrorists' activities — the message is intended merely to draw attention to the terrorist organization's struggle.

As mentioned, the terrorists' goal is to harm the morale of the civilian population. Therefore, from a strategic perspective, terrorism must be fought on precisely this level — as psychological warfare. A state faced with widespread terrorism must concentrate its intellectual and physical efforts on keeping up the morale of its citizens, and strengthening their ability to cope with the threat of terrorism.



Those fighting against terrorism must understand that the war is being waged on the home front and it is the civilians who are the target. Terrorism is perhaps the classic example in which it is possible to win the battle and lose the war. In this war, it is possible to achieve respectable successes by wiping out a particular terrorist cell. But if at the same time, the citizens of the state have little sense of personal security and people are afraid to go to public places or travel on buses, then the terrorist organization has achieved its strategic goal; it has won the war of terrorism.

Contending Internationally with Terrorism

Modern, indiscriminate terror has rapidly become the method of choice of many political groups and organizations worldwide. Terrorism, once a purely local, internal problem, has become an international issue without borders. Sovereign states are not only the targets of terrorism, but sometimes its proponents, as well. Many regimes in the world have found terrorism to be a useful means by which to advance their political goals, at relatively low price and with almost no risk of escalation. Over the years, contacts between terrorist organization and states such as the former Soviet Union, East Germany, Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan and others have been exposed. These states assisted terrorist organizations in various areas and sometimes even initiated attacks, trained cells of perpetrators, armed them, and provided them with a safe haven to flee to after the attack.

Most nations initially failed to correctly assess the extent of the terrorist danger on their doorstep. Terrorism was, in their opinion, a remote problem that had nothing to do with them. However, as more and more states came under attack by international or local terrorist organizations, or when their citizens became victims of terrorist attacks in different places around the world, the nature of the threat began to be felt by even the most apathetic nations. And when terrorist attacks began to threaten international transportation routes, tourism, and economic interests, then terrorism began to be seen as a palpable problem shared by most countries in the world.

Since terrorism does not rest on its laurels — it becomes more efficient, more sophisticated, it evolves, and it spreads — neither can those who must contend with it. They have to try to better understand terrorism, its motives, its modus operandi, and its vulnerabilities, and to try to remain one step ahead of the terrorists and anticipate their moves. As the threat posed by international terrorism to world peace and security increases, the international community must constantly seek ways to strengthen ties of cooperation among its members in the fight against terrorism. Contending with terrorism is a tough and complex assignment, which,

without international cooperation, becomes almost mission impossible.

Unconventional Terrorism

Terrorism often comes in waves, with each wave of attacks having a more ruthless character than the previous one and leaving more victims. Researchers on terrorism around the world constantly attempt to prophesy what will characterize the next wave of terrorism and where it will happen. In many of these mental contests between the terrorists and the security forces, the terrorists have the upper hand. Over the years, terrorism has become more sophisticated, more lethal, and more frightening. And the future does not look rosy.

Many researchers have been warning for years that the next wave of international terrorism will be of an unconventional nature — using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. The attacks in Japan in early 1995, in which a terrorist organization, for the first time, used chemical weapons to inflict indiscriminate injury on civilians, proved to everyone that non-conventional terrorism was no longer an academic matter, but a palpable and substantial threat to world peace and security. The differences of opinion and disagreements on the matter of unconventional terrorism that had been going on for years dissipated the very moment that the poisonous sarin gas was released in the tunnels of the Tokyo subway. The anthrax attacks in the United State have illustrated to anyone needing further proof that the problem of unconventional terrorism is not just a futuristic scenario or theory.

Terrorism is considered to be the weapon of the weak, while chemical weapons are often seen as the weapons of poor countries. It does not take the resources, facilities, or technological capacities of a state to produce lethal quantities of poisonous chemical gases. Only minimal knowledge of chemistry, combined with a primitive laboratory and a few basic ingredients, most of which can be freely purchased, is sufficient to provide a terrorist organization almost anywhere in the world with highly dangerous materials of unconventional warfare.

However, the threat of chemical terrorism is not the greatest danger in terms of unconventional terrorism. Alongside materials of chemical warfare, there are various ways by which terrorist organizations may acquire nuclear and fissionable materials and use them in terrorist attacks. These materials are available on the black market in East European countries together with "scientists for hire", who have been fired from nuclear facilities. The availability of these technicians and of black-market nuclear materials could enable Third World states and those they sponsor to obtain a level of nuclear capability unobtainable to them before the collapse of the Communist bloc.

And, as if this were not enough, there is also the danger of biological terrorism. Terrorist organizations or states that support terrorism can use such means to spread germs throughout the target population with the goal of causing widespread sickness and death, as has happened recently in the United States.

To conclude, terrorism is one of the most widespread violent means used today to achieve political objectives, both locally and internationally. As such it would appear that this phenomenon will continue to trouble human history in the foreseeable future. Only broad international agreement on the nature of the phenomenon, the scale of the threat, together with the steps required to thwart it and punish its perpetrators and their supporters, will enable the countries of the world to fight terrorism effectively and to minimize its influence.

THE DISPUTES OVER TWO CHURCHES IN THE HOLY LAND

MOTI ZAKEN – ADVISOR ON ARAB AFFAIRS TO THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY



National Photo Collection / Photographer: Moshe Milner

The disputes over two churches in the Holy Land, as reflected by the public statements of Christian delegates, is closely connected to the diminishing position of Christians in the Holy Land.

After 35 days of siege during April-May of this year, the crisis at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem was brought to an end. Thirteen armed Palestinians who were wanted by the Israeli government on charges of acts of terror and murder, were able to leave the country, unharmed, thanks to Israel's willingness and sensitivity to Christian demands worldwide to end the siege on the holy Church.

The stand-off at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem has indeed ended, but a grave truth emerged from it, just as it emerged from other conflicts between Muslims and Christians in the Holy Land. During the confrontation and its critical moments, the representatives of the Christian Church hastened to criticize Israel, while at the same time they were very reluctant, not to say fearful, to denounce the actions of the Palestinians.

Four years after the beginning of the crisis over the site near the Church of the Annunciation in Nazareth, one feels compelled to draw comparisons and conclusions. In light of the declarations of some Church officials, I would like to suggest that the Christian attitude shaped not only the progress of the disputes in question, but also reflects the nature of the

National Photo Collection / Photographer: David Rubinger

relationship, or in fact, the "balance of fear" between Christians, Muslims and Jews in the Holy Land. Comparing the public statements of the representatives of the Holy See is very telling and worth sharing with the public.

In Bethlehem

In Bethlehem, two hundred armed Palestinians stormed into the Church of the Nativity and locked themselves inside, turning the ancient and holy church into a fortification. Among the Palestinians who practically conquered the church, together with its monks, were several senior and wanted terrorists. They had figured, quite rightly, that the Israeli army would be extremely reluctant to pursue them inside the church. On the other hand, in their brutal act they did not show any sensitivity to one of the holiest churches in the Christian world. Nonetheless, Church officials spoke out publicly, criticizing Israel in a clear voice and warning the Israeli authorities not to enter violently into the site of the church. In their public statements, Church officials overlooked the grave desecration of the holy church by armed Palestinians. When an exchange of gunfire occurred between the Palestinians within the church building and the Israelis outside, Father David Jaeger of the Vatican accused Israel of "a barbaric act, against society and against humanity". He threatened that an Israeli action would have "a catastrophic effect" on the 1973 agreement between the Vatican and the State of Israel.

In Nazareth

This is not the first time the Palestinians have desecrated the holiness of churches under their jurisdiction. The use of churches in Beth Jalla as shooting posts aiming at the Israeli neighborhood of Gilo in south Jerusalem, is another example. Nonetheless, the major dispute between Muslims and Christians in the Holy Land erupted in the city of Nazareth, under Israeli jurisdiction, four years ago when Muslim extremists of the Islamic Movement took control of the main plaza in Nazareth, in close proximity to the Church of the Annunciation, turning it into an outdoor mosque. In this flagrant infraction, the Muslim extremists prevented the implementation of the original plan of the municipality, to turn the land into an open plaza for the public and pilgrims expected in Nazareth in the year of the Millennium. The Muslim extremists erected a large tent and turned it into an outdoor temporary mosque, named after "Shihab al-Din" whose tomb is allegedly situated in the corner of the square. The Muslims ignored the law, turning the site into a center of incitement against Christianity and against the West. Several Muslims attacked Christian pilgrims on their way to the Church of the Annunciation, and on Easter 1999, Muslim hooligans attacked Christian residents of the city and damaged their property.

Following the belligerent take-over of the site near the Church of the Annunciation, the Israeli government sought a court order to evacuate the Muslims from the plaza, but the legal process ended only in October 1999, when the court repudiated all Muslim claims over the land. The conflict between Christians and Muslims escalated, paralyzing the municipality of Nazareth, and forcing the Israeli government to intervene in the dispute. Two previous governmental committees had approved the building of a mosque in the plaza, in order to guarantee the peacefulness of the historical visit of Pope John Paul II in Israel in the year 2000. Recently, the Muslims decided, again, to take matters into their own hands and in November 2001 they began building the mosque without legal approval of the planning authority.

In early March 2002, the present government decided to revoke the previous resolutions, concluding that no mosque would be built in the land near the Church of the Annunciation.

As a coordinator of the recent governmental committee dealing with the dispute in Nazareth, I watched in amazement as Christian spokesmen refrained from publicly criticizing the Muslim violations of Christian holy places. On the other hand, severe public condemnations were addressed against the Israeli government. Many Christians, who felt strongly against the idea of building a mosque in the disputed plaza in Nazareth, were not willing to speak in public or even to appear in front of the committee. The committee heard several Christian foreigners, but only one native Christian was willing to appear before the committee. Several others agreed to speak only under the condition that their identity would remain undisclosed. They were afraid to speak out publicly, fearing for their personal security, as a result of a campaign of terror by activists in the Islamic Movement.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Muslim intimidation has succeeded in silencing representatives of the Christian Church, who were reluctant to criticize in public the Muslim transgressors of law and abusers of their churches, both in Bethlehem and Nazareth. The reluctance of Church officials to confront Palestinian or Muslim disregard of their holy sites represents a distressing result of the "balance of fear" between Muslims and Christians.

Relations between Muslims, Christians and Jews have known many turns throughout history. The decrease in power of the Christian communities in the Arab world throughout the twentieth century is not a secret. While assessing the falling number and declining status of Christians in the Middle East, one cannot ignore the scenes in which Church officials fear to confront the Muslims in a firm and brave manner while choosing to criticize Israel.

AFGHANISTAN: HOW THE DRUG TRADE SUPPORTS TERRORISM

INSPECTOR YIFAT STEINBERGER – RESEARCH DIVISION, INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT,
ISRAEL POLICE HQ



The dramatic events around the world since the September 11th terrorist attacks suddenly pushed deprived and backward Afghanistan center-stage of international concern. For the attacks were the work of terrorist organizations who had taken over the State, no less, and who, analysts conclude, had financed their deadly objectives from profits made on the international drug trade. Afghanistan in the control of fundamentalist terrorists provides us an instructive instance of how the drug trade can be exploited as a weapon in a war to undermine Western civilization's cherished values. It is an instance that proves the drug trade to be one of the strategic enemies of world peace in the 21st century.

By the late 1990's poppy cultivation and opium manufacture in Afghanistan had reached unprecedented levels, accounting for some 70% of worldwide opium production. And experts believe that the profits from the drug's sale were one of the Taliban's and Al-Quaida's chief sources of funding. It follows, therefore, that the phenomenon of narco-terrorism has implications and consequences far beyond the problem of drug abuse and the take-over of the Western drug market by Afghan opium. In this case one consequence was the 3,000 dead in the destruction of New York's World Trade Center. Another is that the inter-continental smuggling routes provide avenues for terrorist

organizations to diversify into other forms of international crime and to launder huge sums of 'black' money. Afghanistan may be a remote, backward and poverty-stricken state but drug production on the scale attained there generates immense international influence. With total drug income in the tens of billions of dollars, ups and downs in the price and production levels of Afghan opium are capable of unsettling whole national economies.

To date, the effect of the political changes in Afghanistan on world opium production levels and prices are unclear and unpredictable. Even after the Taliban's ouster by the combined forces of the U.S.A. and the Northern Alliance, Afghanistan is likely to remain one of the world's poorest states and as such a potential source of opium poppy production, whatever the declared policy of its new rulers and their international backers. However, if Afghan production does drop off, Myanmar (formerly Burma) may well exploit the opportunity and the vacuum, to increase its own opium production and regain its former dominance of the international heroin market.

As far as Israeli heroin consumption is concerned, no proof exists that the drug here comes in from Afghanistan. Nonetheless, we should be on the alert for a shift in prices on the Israeli street and for a shortage in supply, even if perhaps a temporary one only.

A VERY SPECIAL JOB: DISASTER VICTIM IDENTIFICATION

NAOMI SHAPIRA – HEAD, DIVISION OF INFORMATION SERVICES,
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY

Introduction

When in 1974 the government transferred responsibility for Israel's internal security from the army to the Israel Police (IP) one of the tasks also transferred was that of identifying the civilian casualties of national disasters. In fact, the IP's Disaster Victims Identification Unit (DVIU) had been helping the army identify its own war dead for a number of years. Since 1980, however, the brunt of the DVIU's work has shifted from the victims of 'regular' warfare to the victims of 'peacetime' attacks on the civilian population – terrorist shootings, car-bombings and the like – as well as of the much rarer natural disasters. The Unit has assumed a civilian rather than a military orientation: for example, the site of a terrorist attack is now defined and treated as a crime scene. Two other outstanding features of this special unit are the assistance delegations it sends to multi-casualty disasters around the world, and at home, its extensive deployment of trained volunteers, who have a particularly strong motivation for taking on what must be surely one of the most traumatizing forms of voluntary work imaginable.

The Disaster Victims Identification Unit

The DVIU is only one component of the IP's Criminal Identification and Forensic Science Department. But the special character of this second Intifada has thrust its men into the spotlight of public attention, as well as into something like hero status. At National Police Headquarters, the Unit's strength numbers some 10 senior officers, responsible for the different elements of its work: disaster victims identification, equipment development, command and control, training, etc. But the officers the public sees on its television screens are the men of the DVIU's Field Assistance Unit, dispatched to each disaster site to reinforce the local force's Technical Identification Officers.

On the strength of the Field Assistance Unit are 20 senior officers, 180 Technical Identification Officers (TIOs), five mobile identification laboratories (stationed in readiness at the IP's District Command HQs), and hundreds of Civil Guard volunteers.

Working at a Disaster Site

In these last two years the number of disaster casualties the DVIU has been called on to identify has rocketed, from 23 in the whole of 2000 to 179 in 2001. Towards the end of 2002 the number of victims stood at 500! By far the greater part of this increase is the result of terrorist activity, with collapsed buildings and multi-vehicle road accidents accounting for the remainder. At every site the DVIU has one paramount objective, to identify each victim with absolute certainty as quickly as possible, without disturbing or damaging the evidence required for the subsequent criminal investigation. The first stage of victim identification is carried out at the site itself — taking fingerprints, registering any other identifying marks, and photographing and preserving every product of the event, down to the tiniest part. Where the identification evidence from the first stage is insufficient, further tests are conducted at the Institute of Forensic Medicine (there, the forensic anthropologist, Superintendent Dr. Tzipi Kahana, is the DVIU representative).

Volunteers in Victim Identification

The great majority of the 600 men who have volunteered for the terrible but essential work of gathering up body parts are members of Israel's Jewish Ultra-Orthodox communities. They find the motivation and mental stamina for the work in its very sacredness. Even in secular terms, it is not difficult to perceive the holiness in what they do. Moreover, they perform this self-assumed duty not only at the dramatic televised disasters but at the everyday road accident too. The criteria for acceptance to this very special corps of volunteers have been agreed upon by the IP and the rabbis of the Ultra-Orthodox society.

A second smaller volunteer corps comprises 25 dentists who carry out forensic dental investigations, supported by a further 200 dentists recruited in emergencies by order of the Minister of Labor.

Challenges

One of the problems that the chief of the DVIU, Commander Shalom Tsaroom, has been giving extra attention to recently is the health and safety, both physical and mental, of his TIOs. The source of the physical risk is the TIOs' regular handling of possibly infectious body parts and fragments, plus all the hundreds of other substances they come into contact with (the solution is to issue the men personal safety kits). The mental risks are burn-out and cumulative traumatization from continually being surrounded by, and having to gather up, mangled mutilated bodies (here the solution is to provide supportive psychological care).

The Future

The pace of events in the Middle East allows no one and no body to rest on their laurels. The possibility of terrorists using non-conventional weapons is already worrying the IP's senior commanders and measures are already in hand to make the DVIU ready for even this eventuality. It is all part and parcel of the investment in planning and training in Israel and in assistance at disasters overseas that have given the DVIU its international reputation. Delegations have come to Israel from some of the world's leading police forces to learn its secrets and be trained in its methods.

Policing

IS IT STILL POSSIBLE, IN THESE TIMES, TO EXPAND A POLICE STATION'S PATROL FORCE?

COMMANDER DR. PINHAS YEHEZKEALLY –
NATIONAL SECURITY COLLEGE, ISRAEL

Introduction

The tempestuous events of this last year have vividly demonstrated just how small the police force is that the Israel Police can put into the field, relative to the size of the challenges facing it. In the media, IP commanders have used words like "collapse" and spoken of the urgency of a major reinforcement of manpower. But the idea that in the near future the Ministry of Finance will give the IP the funds to significantly increase the forces at its disposal is a delusion best gotten rid of before undertaking any assessment of IP manpower needs. Expenditure on policing is one of the largest items in the public services budget and, as such, will always be marked down for cuts by Ministry of Finance planners. Only recently, just before the events of the current intifada broke out, we faced this very prospect, to the point that the then head of the IP'S Human Resources Division was moved

to warn in the national media that any meddling with policemen's terms of service could re-ignite the campaign to set up that dreaded prospect — a trade union for policemen. It was the 1978-79 campaign for a trade union which eventually brought about the dramatic upgrading of Israeli policemen's conditions of employment.

Given this financial brick wall, is it possible to still contemplate bringing about a real increase in the number of officers available for field duty? In my humble opinion it is, but only if we are willing to reconceptualize the force's basic structure and the way it goes about its work.

Background: We Do Not Have Enough Patrolmen

The public's sense of security and its perception of police force effectiveness goes in direct relation to the force's 'visibility' and how much it 'makes itself felt' among the citizens it serves. Hence, the vital need of the IP as a whole to increase the number of officers on patrol and beat duty. How much more so is this need vital to a national police force compelled to divide its resources between two opposed spheres of activity — crime-fighting and national security — and especially urgent in these mad times, when external threats to the state take priority over conventional policing functions. The full absurdity of the current state of affairs is illustrated by the question a newspaper columnist asked his readers, in 1999: "If our police forces were authentic local forces and the mayor of every locality was responsible for its policing, would we elect any mayor who had just three patrol cars patrolling a town of 90,000 people, as happens today?" The answer is obvious, but the plain state of affairs is that we do not have enough police officers to meet national needs, let alone local ones.

Background: Other Problems of the Status Quo

The founders of the London police force in 1829, the world's first official uniformed force, many of whose principles still govern modern police forces, made the decision that they needed a corps of full-time, professionally trained, paid officers. Until then, policing was largely an informal, non-professional, out-of-hours activity on the 'posse' model, familiar to us from cowboy films. A small trained and paid regular cadre — the sheriff and his deputies — reinforced itself from the citizen body whenever the need arose, swearing in a posse as temporary law-officers. The method used to police the 'Wild West' was the same method used to keep law and order in Saxon England from 500 to 1066 A.D. A remnant of it survives to this day in the authority of a regular police officer, in an emergency, to delegate some of his powers to ordinary citizens. But as a regular method of policing, 1829 saw the end of this system in the urbanized world. Since then the ruling premise has been that officers are recruited into an organized professional force, to serve in it until retirement. And this is the premise informing the Police Order which regulates policing in Israel.

Policing's current organizing principle possesses two distinct advantages. First is the ready availability of manpower in times of urgent need. As Article 15 of the Police Order says: "A police officer is on duty at all times" and can be called to his duty at any hour and in any place. Secondly, one can invest in the long-term professionalization of a regular force, but not of a temporary one.

The problem is that the supposed advantage of professionalization is, in practice, hardly felt at the level of the ordinary patrolman. Analysis of the evaluations made by Israeli police stations in recent years reveals that, for all the resources invested in training, our front-line force is unskilled! And, when it comes to the men and women riding in the patrol cars, the state of affairs is ten times worse. Most of them are either very young and inexperienced (because anyone showing talent is at once 'whipped off' to detective or intelligence work and/or to one of the special task forces) or they are 18-21-year-olds doing their compulsory military service in the police and still lacking the maturity for the demands of patrol work. In one recent experiment, in the Israeli town of Ra'anana, where hired civilian workers and IP patrolmen operated together, the civilians performed aspects of the work with markedly more success than their uniformed colleagues.

Policing's current organizing principle also possesses two distinct disadvantages. Firstly, inflexibility. For example, officers cannot be employed exclusively at the time of day they are most needed, at night, because they are entitled to a shift rota which allows them to lead a normal life. Another example: if five officers man a service center and the peak hours of demand are from 08:00 - 10:30 and from 17:00 - 21:00, a regular officer's hours of work cannot usually be split to put him on duty at both these times, so that two full shifts have to be operated instead of one, and the result is a few hours of heavy pressure for everyone and idleness for the remainder of the shift.

The second disadvantage is cost. Many elements of police work require fit men and women, usually under age 35. Over that age a proportion of officers are no longer fit enough for the work and in one way or another, long before retirement age, move out of field duties. The sums that have to be set aside to pay the retirement benefits policemen can receive at a relatively early age are swelling from year to year, putting heavy strain on an already strained budget.

Two Routes to a Solution

Two solutions are available to us. Both will be hard to carry through, very hard, but their great virtue is that, by and large, they require no extra resources from outside the police. Their disadvantage is that carrying them through will require courage in decision-making and firm resolve in execution, because their effect is to alter the distribution of power within the IP, which of course means that resistance to the changes will be immense — and not necessarily for the right reasons. Both solutions demand internal structural changes, which uproot some basic assumptions governing police work. These basic assumptions govern many Western police forces, not only the IP.

Route 1: Downsizing the Regular Force in Favor of an Ad Hoc Force

In light of the above, the first proposed solution is to change the composition of the IP's field force. The new force will in fact be two forces: a full-time skilled skeleton force commanding a much larger 'prevention and visibility' force. The second will be made up of temporary employees, hired by a contractor and paid by the hour, employed only as and when needed and wielding police powers only when on duty. Imagine, then, a situation in which every police station is given a manpower budget, which it spends to hire temporary policing help when and where needed, in accordance with a prearranged plan. The temporary help would only be given powers to detain and arrest criminal suspects (i.e. no more than the already existing powers of a 'citizen's arrest') and would be trained to stabilize threatening situations until 'professional' officers can take over. The model I am suggesting is the Ra'anana model mentioned earlier. As in that experiment, the eligibility criteria for the temporary policemen would be strict — at least two years academic studies in an applied discipline, success in an army junior command course, etc. (University and college students will always be a useful recruitment source.) And the contractor would be responsible for providing their transport.

The model possesses several critical advantages:

- It is much cheaper than the regular model. For the cost of one regular officer several temporary ones can be hired, whose skills and background can be specified in advance, who will never be too old for

the job, and who will never go on leave.
- In times of crisis such as we are living through now it is much easier to get a budget supplement from the Ministry of Finance for an ad hoc reinforcement of temporary employees than for a permanent addition of permanent positions.
- The quality and service-orientation of the IP's front-line officers will rise markedly. It is a common problem with many police forces that citizens and tax payers usually do not come in contact with their best recruits; police manpower priorities ensure that they are most often dealt with by the youngest, the least experienced and the least skilled of its officers! Under the proposed model, the temporary officers will all have completed at least two years' academic study in an applied discipline and have done army service in combat roles. They will not have been socialized by police training school and their approach to their work will be uncontaminated by the IP organizational culture.
- The IP will be compelled to adapt itself to preventive policing methods, which is definitely the more effective approach to crime-fighting.
- More officers can be allocated to peak demand times without having to worry about shift patterns, manpower limitations, etc.
- The IP will be compelled to further professionalize its permanent workforce to take on the command and back-up roles required to manage its new temporary staff.
- The temporaries will constitute a high-quality pool of recruitment to the permanent force, so that, with time, the overall quality of that force will be noticeably upgraded.
- The model allows the IP to significantly augment its force of front-line patrolmen and hence improve its salience and 'positive friction' with law-abiding citizens.

Disadvantages:
- The chief disadvantages of the model will show up when emergency conditions obtain on Israel's frontiers and most of the pool of potential temporary recruits, called up for reserve army duty, will be unavailable. We should bear in mind, however, that many current IP patrolmen, the youngest of the IP's recruits as we have noted, are also subject to reserve military service.
- Another and very substantial disadvantage is the critical change in police organization and structure the model entails. The surgery may be necessary but not the less painful for that.
- A third disadvantage is that the changes require amendments to legislation.

How will the model work in practice?
The new model should be tried out first in the 23 police stations which register the bulk of Israel's crime, plus selected other stations struggling with particularly severe security problems. Each station would be allocated a budget for the hire of temporary officers and, as soon as local commanders have accustomed themselves to the new approach and absorbed its advantages, would begin the process of converting permanent positions to temporary ones.

The temporary officers will be trained locally at District police academies, a two-day course in powers of detention and arrest, in the basics of policing as a public service, and most importantly in identifying those complex problems which it will be their role to stabilize until regular officers can take over (the Ra'anana experiment showed this to be not a particularly difficult task). The temporaries will ride in new, easily identifiable vehicles (in Ra'anana – red-painted jeeps), supplied by the contractors and replaced by them whenever they need repair. Each station will use its computerized mapping of local criminal and security activity to map its 'hot spots', both by location and time (time of day, day of week). The mapping must include not only the distribution

of police files – the mere tip of the iceberg of all activity reported to the police – but all calls to the switchboard, and on the basis of this mapping the station will choose where to position its new 'visibility and prevention' manpower. The test of the success of the new force will be a dual one: a reduction in the number of police files opened in the hot-spot areas in the second year of the force's deployment (in the first year the number of files will, perversely, rise as the public develops trust in the new law enforcement effort and so reports more problems) and surveys of local residents' satisfaction.

Route 2: Changing the Basic Principles Determining the Structure and Operations of Local Police Stations

The second possible solution to manning problems – entirely compatible and combinable with the first – is for investigation and intelligence manpower to be cut back and withdrawn from local stations to District and Sub-District headquarters and for local policing to be reorganized around an expanded force of patrolmen.

Whereas the majority of Western police forces base their crime-fighting strategy on patrol work, the IP has built its force on investigation and intelligence, on the principle of allocating street-level officers to specialized operational units and sectors. To this approach there are three main consequences:

1. The IP has **fewer officers on the streets** than other national forces of comparable size, for the reason that it allocates its best manpower to office jobs (handling investigation files) and to catching criminals, so that law-abiding citizens hardly ever see them. (As for the over-concentration of staff at HQ level and the overcrowding of senior ranks, that is a different problem, for which I offer no optimistic prognosis.)

2. The manpower available for dealing with any particular incident or case is even less than indicated above, as officers have responsibility not for all elements of policing but only for the element they have been trained for. What, for example, is there in a traffic incident he is caught up in to attract the interest of an investigating officer? Worse: the different units and branches develop rivalries and the lack of a 'team playing' ethos impairs operational effectiveness.

3. Despite a significant increase in the number of investigators and detectives, the number of cases reaching the courts, already suffering from overload, cannot rise by a matching amount and neither can the number of prison cells. To make matters worse, the courts have their own agenda, which by no means fits the IP priority of effective deterrence by punishment. The result has been that the bulk of the increase in investigator and detective manpower has gone into 'closing cases' rather than seeing them through to a proper end. Even the cases that do reach the courts have a low marginal value in terms of deterrence. The necessary conclusion is that, at the practical level, the emphasis should be placed less on expanding investigative manpower and more on upgrading its quality and recasting its priorities, so that the 'correct' cases reach the courts.

The three problems outlined above explain the direction now being taken by a number of western forces – to cut back on investigation and intelligence and make a versatile, multipurpose force the core of front-line policing, laying the main emphasis on prominence, prevention and providing a satisfactory service to 'law-abiding citizens'. This new strategy is combined with an upgrading of investigation and intelligence forces at District level and, at that level, giving their work higher priority. The strategy has produced remarkable results, a striking example being Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Over the last decade, that city has reduced reported crime by an amazing 40-60% (an achievement at least equal to that of the New York force but much less widely-studied). From a centralized reactive force organized into urban precincts and based on motorized patrols working from a single center, Amsterdam went over to a decentralized force dispersed among small Neighborhood Teams of 60-100 officers, the great majority in uniform, which operated multi-functionally and were backed up, as needed, by District HQ from its pool of investigators and project teams (the equivalent of our investigation and intelligence branches). According to the man responsible for this change, then Amsterdam Police Commissioner Eric E. Nordholt, concentrating on street-level operations has a double benefit. Firstly, a police force is too resource-poor for its officers to ignore what is happening on their doorstep, on the grounds that what is happening is not what they have been trained to deal with. Secondly, the more removed the police are from the street the less they feel the need to solve its problems, and vice versa, the more involved they are, the more committed they will be to achieving a solution.

In Israel things are done differently. Citizen-centered policing is conspicuous by its absence. What needs to happen here is a replication of the health care model, whereby most health care is provided by family doctors, who only when necessary send their patient to see a specialist.

In Conclusion

The status quo in Israel, characterized by a chronic shortage of policemen and the rarity of the occasions when the law-abiding citizen meets the IP's best representatives, is not a state of affairs decreed by heaven. It is the outcome of the network of basic assumptions guiding IP strategy. Rapid adjustment to alternative possibilities and the courage to make big changes can bring about a substantial improvement in the numbers of officers on the street, and in their quality and effectiveness too.

Is the challenge offered here of diverting existing resources to front-line policing practically feasible? I should say that, with all its experience of recent years, the IP is well capable of finding a way to make the new strategy work. All it requires is courageous decision-making and then steeliness of purpose in following through.

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SPEAKING UP



When a tremendous explosion ripped through Mahaneh Yehuda — Jerusalem's teeming outdoor market — in April of this year, Israel Police spokesman for the foreign press, Superintendent Gil Kleiman, knew he could expect a large number of reporters from the international media. More than 1,200 foreign journalists were here to cover the visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, and most were based just minutes away from the market. When Kleiman reached the scene, however, he was astounded by the number who had shown up. Foreign news crews filled the street, wall to wall, even on the rooftops. He began briefing the reporters in small manageable groups, with backup teams from the Ministry of Public Security and the Government Press Office. Within half an hour they managed to cover everyone.

Since the beginning of the year, he has briefed the foreign media at the scenes of too many suicide bombings, talked to hundreds of reporters and logged dozens of extended interviews with foreign newspapers.

The relationship, however, goes back just a year, since he became the foreign press spokesman for the Israel Police (IP). He is the first person to hold that position, and his appointment signals a sharp change in the function of the police since the violence began in September 2000. While it once focused on fighting crime, which held limited interest to foreigners, it is today mainly a terror-fighting force, which has major international implications.

His posting also signals a new awareness in the police of the importance of international public opinion. Before Kleiman came on the scene, foreign correspondents found it notoriously difficult to reach the regular spokesmen in the Israel Police. When they did reach them, the spokesmen often had little time for them, little understanding of their needs, and in some cases, little English.

The decision to hire a spokesman specifically for the foreign press was part of a deliberate strategy change in January 2001 by the incoming Police Commissioner, Inspector-General Shlomo Aharonishky. Aharonishky saw that the foreign press relied heavily on information supplied by sources abroad or in the Palestinian Authority, because of their difficulty in dealing with the Israel Police.

"You have to keep people

informed, otherwise rumors spread," says Kleiman. If the IP did not give proper information, the reporters would look elsewhere for their facts, which would probably be incorrect.

Kleiman emphasizes that he is the guardian of the image of the Israel Police, not of the State of Israel. "I see the police as my client," he says. "I give facts and will explain why we did something. But I am not here to justify what we did. The police does not deal with politics, just with the law, and if reporters ask me political questions, I will not answer."

Within a short time, he has certainly become an important resource for the foreign journalists. Gil Kleiman has changed the relationship of the IP with the foreign press.

His day usually starts around 9 a.m. He never goes anywhere without the basic tool of his trade — his two beepers, which he constantly consults for news from police precincts throughout the country. He is also attached to his cell-phone, which is constantly ringing.

When he gets to the location, he stands by the highest-ranking officer on the scene and listens to his briefing to the Israeli press. As soon as they are finished, Gil repeats exactly the same information to the foreign media.

"It is important not to give information to the foreign press until the Israeli public hears it first, so that rumors do not start flying," he says. "It is not right that CNN should report things the Israeli public does not already know." He then answers their questions, being careful not to disclose classified material.

The foreign press, he says, is "meticulous" about getting its facts right, often phoning him back for very minor or technical details. Part of the reason, he says, is that they have later deadlines than their Israeli colleagues because of the time difference with North America.

He is not worried that the information he provides to the foreign journalists will be used against Israel. "As long as they are getting the facts right, they are entitled to interpret them as they see fit, even if I disagree."

Born in the US, Kleiman moved to Israel in 1980 after completing a BA in history at George Washington University. Within four months of arrival, Gil joined the army, where he was a combat engineer, dealing with explosives. When he was released in May 1982 he fulfilled his lifelong dream of joining the police. He was initially tapped as a bomb disposal technician, which, he says, was more boring than the public image might suggest.

In 1987 Kleiman went to law school at Bar-Ilan University, and completed his degree three years later. A variety of positions that he subsequently held within the IP included another three years with the Israel Police security unit. When his current position was originally proposed, he was eager to begin. He was partially attracted by the idea of working with foreigners, and partially attracted by the thrill of working with the media. "I'm a news junkie," he admits.

"One year ago, the police did not have an international image to keep up," he says. "Today, when there is breaking news in the Middle East, people are beginning to recognize our blue uniforms."

Based on an article from the Jerusalem Post, April 26, 2002.

HASHISH IS BACK

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Introduction: Hashish in Israel

From the early 1970's to the mid-1990's, hashish was the most widely used drug in Israel. Then marijuana took over that status, and trade in and use of hashish shrank almost to nothing. Now, since late 2001 hashish is clearly making a come-back – not in quantities to rival or replace marijuana – but it is again on the menu of widely-available drugs. Several information sources confirm this assessment: seizures of the drug are on the rise, there is general talk of expanded planting in Lebanon and of increased demand in Israel, and police intelligence sources report a wider distribution of the drug throughout the country. The main sources of hashish supplies to Israel are Lebanon and Egypt, with some imported from India and hints also of a route from Morocco (Lebanon is the main source of supply to the whole of the Middle East, the rest of the world market being fed mainly from Morocco, Pakistan and Afghanistan).

Hashish does not have specialist suppliers; its traffickers also push a range of drugs. The rise in the use of cannabis and its various derivatives is part of the general rise in Israel over recent years in the number of drug-users and the quantity of drugs consumed. Hashish users, all police intelligence reports agree, are mostly adolescents and young adults in their 20's, and a few older people who used other drugs in their younger years. As with any illegal drug, for most users the use of the drug is their only criminal act. But other users have a wider criminal activity, sometimes in order to finance their addiction.

Seizures: From late 2001 and early 2002 hashish seizures became more frequent, mostly in

the 20 kilogram range and mostly seized close to the Lebanese border, indicating where the drug had been obtained. Two large consignments were also captured in the south of the country; these, intelligence reports indicated, may have been smuggled across the border from Egypt. During the whole of 2001 the total seized was 143 kg (the greater part in the second half of the year) compared to a mere 30 kg in 2000. Since the beginning of 2002 a further 74 kg have been taken. The upward trend is clear but the quantities trafficked are still far below the quantities of the early nineties.

The History of Hashish Use in Israel and Around the World

Hashish was the drug of choice in Palestine-Israel for centuries. By the 1980's seizures amounted to thousands of kilograms per year. The nearness of such a huge reservoir of the drug (Lebanon was the almost exclusive source) and its cheapness made it too easily available. And late 20th-century Israel was, after all, part of the worldwide trend to increased drug abuse. Until the late 1980's most of the drug came in by sea, but then the intensified activity of the Israel Navy made a land route preferable. Israeli Arabs and Druze living in the north of the country and with connections across the nearby Lebanese border provided a simple, convenient and low-cost smuggling conduit. Relatively little, it seems, came across the Egyptian border.

But then, in the 1990's as noted, the popularity of the drug suddenly collapsed in favor of marijuana and only tens of kilos of hashish were coming to light each year (with the single exception of 1994 when one part of a legitimate container-load shipped from India to Ashdod was found to be almost 3,000 kilos of hashish). Marijuana seizures for 2001, in contrast, totalled no less than 11.6 tons! This phenomenon of the sudden replacement of one drug by another did not however repeat itself when other drugs, ecstasy for example, started reaching Israel; the new imports were simply added to the 'menu'.

In the worldwide market for hashish, Lebanon had been until the 1990's far and away the main producer, and especially for the European consumer. Then Lebanon's growers began to switch to opium poppies and Morocco took over as the primary hashish source. Between 1989 and 1999, though seizures of hashish worldwide climbed by almost 100%, most of this rise was accounted for by European consumption; elsewhere in the world the consumption of hashish was falling, as it was in Israel.

The Sources of Hashish

Lebanon

In the early nineties, the Lebanese production of opium and cannabis went into decline and did not begin to recover until late in the decade. But by the time of this writing, production had still returned to no more than 10% of earlier peak levels.

The Lebanon-Israel frontier is of course a war frontier and as such under heavy surveillance, but the disputed area around the village of Rajer is a loophole which is heavily exploited for smuggling purposes. Most of this smuggling — as on all Israel's borders — is largely in the hands of Israel's Arabs, Druze and Beduin. On the Lebanese border, however, Israel's former Lebanese militia allies, now given refuge in Israel, also have a hand in the trade, exploiting connections with their former home territory. This is not to say that Jewish Israeli traffickers are uninvolved. They too have established direct links to Lebanese producers and a regular flow of couriers maintains the routes between supply and demand.

Now that Israeli demand for hashish has reawaken, the importance of Lebanon as a source of drug supplies has increased significantly. At the beginning of 2001 hashish was still running third to heroin and cocaine among the drugs crossing the Israel-Lebanon frontier, but a year later consignments were being intercepted of hashish alone, or with hashish as the main element.

As with all drug shipments across the northern border, arms and ammunition always form part of the cargo. This is just one instance of the linkage, notorious all over the world, between drug-smuggling and terrorism. Since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, the militant Hizbullah organization has taken firm control of cross-border smuggling. Hizbullah is a zealously religious movement of Islamic fundamentalism, its actions and men directed by Moslem religious law. As such, it should be disgusted by any contact with drugs; but in practice, its leaders and officers, religious and military alike, hold the drug trade in the palms of their hands. Since Israel's withdrawal, Hizbullah has replaced Israel as the military force patrolling the Lebanese side of the frontier and has set up fixed bases and observation points the length of the frontier. The result is that no smuggling can take place without its knowledge and approval, a position of power it exploits to insist that arms are smuggled together with the drugs. It also uses the drug couriers to obtain

intelligence about the situation on the Israeli side of the frontier.

India

Indian hashish, charas, is grown in the Manali region and harvested in the months of September-October. Containing a high concentration of cannabis's psychoactive ingredient, it is considered a superior product, nicknamed 'Manali gold'. Charas has been coming into Israel for some years now, beginning in the 1990's with the small amounts Israeli backpackers to India would bring back for their own use. With time, a regular courier route developed. Our latest information reports two main regular channels:
(a) Large consignments, up to the tens of kilos, are brought to Israel directly from India or via a third, European country, which is used either for trans-shipment only or is itself a drug destination. These consignments are delivered by two methods: by couriers (on or 'in' their person, or in their luggage), who are usually young Israelis either sent from Israel by professional traffickers or recruited while travelling in India for pleasure and who are paid about $5,000 for each delivery (quite a lot of trips to India are financed in this way). The second method is to conceal the drugs in freight shipments.
(b) Small amounts of a few hundred grams are often sent in the regular mail from India by young Israelis, who aim in this way to avoid being caught with the drugs on them. A few take the risk of hiding the charas on their person or in their luggage.

Egypt

The 215-kilometer Israeli-Egyptian border is officially peaceful and consequently patrolled relatively loosely. The local Beduin exploit this state of affairs, their family and business contacts on both sides of the border, and their detailed knowledge of the terrain to bring in tens of tons of drugs annually. Defiles, wadis and other concealed routes through the hills are used mainly to smuggle marijuana, plus some cocaine and ecstasy; and now hashish has joined them, so far in relatively small quantities (tens of kilos) but still large enough to constitute the largest seizures of hashish in the south in recent years.

Morocco

Morocco is, as described earlier, a chief source of hashish for Europe, as well as for Tunisia and Algeria. Moroccan hashish, with its reputation for high quality, enters Europe by way of Spain. To Israel however, our information indicates, it comes mostly in small amounts of a few kilos at a time, carried by the traffickers themselves on their person or in their luggage, or by couriers. Another method is to hide it in containers of legitimate cargo. However, no seizure in Israel to date can be firmly identified as of Moroccan origin.

Israeli Involvement in the International Hashish Trade

Many Israelis, not a few of them resident outside Israel, are kingpins of the international drug-smuggling routes, in particular of the ecstasy trade. Lately it seems that they have carved themselves an extensive slice, probably not less than half, of the hashish trade too, from South Africa to the United Kingdom, from Morocco to Europe, and especially from India to Europe (to Holland, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, the U.K., etc.) as well as points further west. The charas even reaches Peru, for instance, in exchange for cocaine. Only a small proportion is destined for Israel itself.

Hashish Prices in Israel

Hashish is more expensive than marijuana, which of course makes it more profitable to trade in. Israel Police plain-clothes agents report that prices vary by quality rather than country of origin and are approximately as follows:

- Lebanese: a kilo of high-quality (Zeharat Lebnaan) hashish — $1,000-2,500; and of lower-quality — about $600 (purchase prices in Lebanon).
- Indian: $7,000-8,000 per kilo (purchase price in India) and $80-90 for ten grams on the Israeli street.
- Egyptian: We have no information on prices in Egypt. The little information we have on purchase prices in Israel suggests a kilo sells for about $2,800.

The Future Prospects for Hashish in Israel

We have no clear and convincing explanation for the replacement of hashish by marijuana and for its recent reappearance in the Israeli market. Some attribute hashish's disappearance to the joint campaign conducted by Lebanon, Syria and the United Nations in the early 1990's to destroy Lebanese drug crops and the same sources explain its reappearance by the Lebanese farmers' return to cannabis growing, having found the alternative crops forced on them unprofitable. A second possible factor is the increasing prominence of Israeli traffickers in the international drug trade, especially on the India-Europe routes. A third possible explanation is that the hashish habit in Europe having never faded, perhaps Israelis are being influenced by European behavior as they are in many areas. Also to be borne in mind is the possibility that the recent rise in Israeli hashish consumption is a random phenomenon and not destined to last. As to that, only time will tell.

PSYCHIATRIC CARE IN REMAND CENTERS

CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT NOGA ROGEL – HEAD, COMMUNITY POLICING SECTION, COMMUNITY & CIVIL GUARD DEPARTMENT, ISRAEL POLICE

Since January 2002 a psychiatrist has been co-opted onto the staff of the Abu Kabir Remand Center. The project is the joint initiative of Dr. Motti Mark, director of the nearby Abarbanel Mental Hospital, and of the IP's Chief Medical Officer, Commander Dr. Zvi Lenkovsky. Among his duties are diagnosing all new detainees who appear to require psychiatric care and to provide necessary treatment. Until January, the Remand Center had to incur the trouble and expense of transferring and escorting detainees in need of psychiatric care to a mental health care institution for diagnosis and treatment. Now a psychiatrist is on hand during the working day, and only detainees arriving outside normal working hours and whose condition seems to be urgent need be transferred as before.

A further advantage of the new initiative is that the psychiatrist, having become familiar with the physical and operational conditions of the Center, can now decide whether a detainee is fit to be held there. The availability of the psychiatrist has already reduced the number of escorted transfers by 90%, so that ways are now being sought to extend the project to other remand centers. The virtues of the new initiative are so evident that the IP's Community Policing & Civil Guard Department has also begun looking for volunteer psychiatrists around the country, who would be prepared to provide the same service for detainees held in police station cells.

PARTNERSHIPS

CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT MAIA ZISSO
HEAD, INFORMATION AND INTERNET SECTION
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Introduction

Throughout the industrialized world, public sector budgets have been contracting for some time (at least in relative terms) as central governments come under extreme financial constraint. The natural consequence is that public service managers, unwilling or unable to cut their services according to their cloth, have cast their eyes around for alternative funding sources. 'Partnership' is now the in-vogue word and the two partnership sectors at which eyes are being cast most often are the business sector and the NGOs. In the context of Israeli policing, the banner of partnership is being carried forward primarily by the IP's Community & Civil Guard Department (C&CG), which sees partnerships with community agencies to be the natural vehicle for its Community Policing strategy. For the core concept of the strategy is that the 'top-down' method of law enforcement achieves optimum effectiveness when backed up by the active involvement and resources of the citizens and agencies who want a law-abiding climate in which to live – involvement in prioritizing objectives, in planning projects, in creating a crime-deterrent environment, and even, to a degree, in personally enforcing the law.

By coincidence, the Community Policing concept came to the fore at the same time as business began to abandon the ethos that profit was the only right measure of commercial success, in favor of the broader outlook that there was also a place for social investment. As business beyond doubt had the manpower and the resources to contribute to the right projects, the soil for partnership with the IP seemed only waiting to be sown with the right seed. But then the law itself turned out to be an obstacle. Israeli law is quite inflexible on

the point that the IP may accept resources only from central government ministries. Even resource-sharing partnerships with Local Government Authorities (LGA) are permitted only in areas where the police and the authority share jurisdiction. Contributions of any kind from any other source are quite simply forbidden.

But the C&CG chiefs (current head: Maj.-Gen. Esther Dominissini), convinced that inter-sectoral partnership was an opportunity not to be missed, would not take "no" for an answer. While concentrating their attention on partnerships with the NGOs — and the obstacles in that direction were not small — and local government, they persisted in looking for routes by which business could be brought on board. The fruits of that determination have now been realized.

Partnerships with Local Government

The longest- and strongest-running IP-LGA joint project is the Community Policing Centers Project. The idea behind these Centers — small sub-police-stations in local neighborhoods, staffed by one or two officers — is to get local residents actively involved in their own policing and to feel that they and the uniformed officers form a law enforcement team. To date, no less than 347 Centers are operational, in every part of the country, including Arab towns and villages. A second success is the Joint Vehicle Patrol Project. IP officers and LGA inspectors conduct joint patrols in LGA-supplied vehicles to enforce the law in those domains where the two authorities exercise joint jurisdiction (road traffic, environmental nuisances, etc.). As of now, 64 such vehicles are patrolling in 51 towns.

Partnerships with Other State Institutions

The IP's partner in the Youth Command Project is the army (Israel Defense Forces). The army's Youth Instructors are deployed to attract teenagers into the Civil Guard (an armed volunteer neighborhood patrol force), where they are given a taste of both police work and weapons training. The project is designed to benefit both project partners: the army, by increasing the proportion of conscripts who, when they enroll for compulsory military service at age 18, will volunteer for combat duty; and the IP, by building up a pool of potential police recruits. Other projects link the IP with the Ministries of the Interior, Education, and the Environment.

Partnerships with Commercial Businesses

An assortment of projects are at differing stages of development with a variety of companies,

ranging from two of Israel's largest food manufacturers to hi-tech communications firms and to the huge Military Industries complex.

Partnerships with NGOs

Here again the range of the IP's partners is a wide one, from the Israel Defense & Security Forum, Zionism 2000, the Association for the Prevention of Alcoholism, and the Cyclists Association, to the IDF Retirees Association, youth movements, and the Union of Community Centers. Here we shall turn the spotlight, however, onto just one project in order to demonstrate in some detail how the obstacles to active partnerships have been circumvented, and what the project dynamics are.

The Green Light Association is a non-profit voluntary agency founded to wage war on the high rate of traffic accidents in Israel and to improve driving standards. Since 1999, the Association and the IP have been partners in a large-scale effort to progress towards those two goals. Great care has been taken by both parties to set the project on firm foundations, making each element of the partnership formal, explicit and subject to a signed contract. Solutions have been found to the legal issues. For instance, the problem mentioned earlier — that the IP is barred from accepting resources even from an NGO — has been resolved by making the actual recipient of Green Light funds the Ministry of Transport's National Road Safety Authority, the funds then being transferred legally from the Ministry of Transport to the Ministry of Public Security (parent ministry of the IP). Ethical and public interest issues have been discussed, clarified and placed under the oversight of independent bodies.

The division of resources and labor between the two partners is as follows: The Association funds the provision of new patrol vehicles and their associated equipment for the IP's corps of traffic volunteers. The IP contributes the volunteers, their legal powers, paid professional officers to lead and organize them, training, fuel for the vehicles and uniforms for the volunteers. The formal contract defining the two parties' mutual agreements and obligations states explicitly that the vehicles provided by Green Light and the volunteers it equips will be used exclusively for the enforcement of the traffic laws. The contract also sets out the limitations, rules, conditions and standards the Association requires in order to regulate the volunteers' operations.

The material results of this partnership have been significant beyond cavil. No less than 100 patrol vehicles and their equipment have been supplied and the IP has been able to raise the number of these special volunteers to 8,728 and deploy them in every police district in the country.

Youth

"BETTER A FREE BUTTERFLY THAN A CAGED LION"
A WORKSHOP AT THE ABU KABIR YOUTH REMAND CENTER

MICHAEL RISHVER & DINA ZOHAR
DEPARTMENT FOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT TEL AVIV MUNICIPALITY

Background

For about a year now, the authors, two group leaders from the Tel Aviv Department for Youth Advancement, have been conducting group therapy sessions with young people on remand, in a joint initiative of the Department, the Tel Aviv Anti-Drugs Authority, and the Remand Center itself. On first consideration, we had thought the idea of group therapy could not work: the young remandees were too varied – they were of different ages, had been arrested for different offenses, had different criminal records, etc. – and the state of uncertainty they had been thrown into was too overwhelming. But we found that they felt a real and authentic need to talk to each other in a group context, moderated by neutral figures who presented no physical or emotional threat. In fact, the rationale for the project was summed up for us by one of the remandees, who said, "Better to be a free butterfly than a caged lion". From a life of liberty, to find oneself in a prison cell creates such immense emotional pressure, bewilderment and fear of the future that we thought it right to offer them an opportunity to vent their feelings in a supportive peer context and receive, as a group and individually, some help with their new 'here and now'.

Our specific objectives were:

- To encourage them to voice their feelings and support them through the pain of doing so;
- To inform them of their rights while on remand (to consult with their probation officer and lawyer, to make telephone calls and receive visits);
- To expose their ambivalence between a desire to rehabilitate themselves and the attraction of offending;
- To tell them about the institutions they were likely to be sent to;
- To prepare them for leaving the remand center for a correctional/rehabilitational facility;
- To offer support in any break-down or crisis, such as a suicide attempt or violence from fellow remandees;
- To encourage them to give each other friendship and support during group sessions and afterwards in their cells;
- To put them in touch with outside sources of therapy, if desired.

The Remandees

They came from all over Israel's central region, their ages ranging from 13 to 18. They were on

remand for theft, robbery, burglary, assault, drug abuse and drug pushing, indecent acts, rape and attempted murder; some of the offenses were committed within the family, some outside it. For most it was their second or third arrest, or more, and most had spent time in residential homes and facilities of one kind or another. Their ethnic backgrounds were of all kinds: Arab, Israeli and the children of foreign laborers; some were immigrants from Russia and Ethiopia, others were born in Israel. All said their first offense resulted in part from their parents' poverty. Most had only one active parent (the mother).

Methods

The first decision was to give the group a 'train stop' format, that is, individuals could join and leave at any juncture. Well aware of the limitations such a format set, we believed that in the particular setting of a remand center there was no alternative. So, given these limitations, how does the group work?

- We introduce ourselves to the participants: We are group leaders from the Department for Youth Advancement, who will be with the group for a year or more. We are neither prison officers nor probation officers nor police officers nor lawyers, i.e., not part of the legal system. We are not interested in knowing for what offense you are on remand. Each remandee will chose by himself and for himself what he wants to talk about and how far he will go in talking about it.
- We go into each participant's criminal record (how many arrests, for how long) and then ask if anyone wants to talk about any particular subject. To get things going we rely on the veteran participants, if there are any present.
- Every participant and every subject is equal and equally legitimate. The only condition set is "no names and no details of offenses committed". We try to encourage them to talk to each other, to give support, to expose their own ambivalences, and to continue the conversation after the group session is over.
- We try to get participants to see the positive aspects of what they describe — about themselves, about strong friendships, feelings for their parents at home, worrying about friends and giving genuine help to cell-mates in trouble.
- When the dialog reaches highly sensitive issues, often the talker suddenly launches into a demand for "social justice". This is in itself a painful and recurring topic. We try to deflect the issue to the group. In most cases a question mark is left hanging in the air, because the young remandees, well aware of the gravity of their offenses, nevertheless find it hard to identify with their victims. A large number of them talk of their fear of "opening up the box of your feelings, because your real feelings can drive you mad". At one session, group members began talking of the guilt they felt for past offenses. During a reconstruction we did with them, some recalled childhood memories from when they were 6, 7 and 8 years old, when they committed their first offense, some of the offenses being no more than the pranks normal at that age. They recalled adults around them calling them "bad", a "no-good", a "brute", or saying "You'll never amount to anything". They described how the experience of that first offense had remained with them and in practice had decided the future course of their life.

Conclusions

The dictum, "Better to be a free butterfly than a caged lion", offers a metaphor for the sensitive soul of a young boy who, for reasons of personal, family and social circumstances, finds himself "a caged lion", and how hard and painful it is for someone still only part way along the road to maturity to live this stage of his life in a prison cell.

We believe that these youths, despite the offenses they are accused of, have the right to dignity and respect. We are committed to giving them the opportunity of receiving support and aid in the physical and emotional here and now of a prison cell, for it is in these circumstances that they have to 'search their souls' and arrive at a reckoning. Much of the meaning of these group conversations may well not become clear to them until some time later, perhaps much later, but we invite other members of our profession to 'pick up the gauntlet' and set up similar groups.

One practical conclusion from our own experience is that many of the youths had ended up in the remand center because they had not been able to cope with a long period of house arrest without group peer support. We are now examining the possibility of setting up a support group for young people sentenced to house arrest, in the belief that group peer support will help them cope with the strain and help them chose a path to a normal lifestyle, and not a return to crime.

THE EXPERIENCE OF FRIENDSHIP PROJECT TAKES TO THE AIR

SUPERINTENDENT AVSHALOM BOSHARI – YOUNG OFFENDERS OFFICER, SOUTHERN DISTRICT, ISRAEL POLICE

The Experience of Friendship projects are one of the efforts the Israel Police makes to prevent immigrant youth slipping into a career of crime. The projects offer the youths the opportunity of experiencing a wide range of enrichment activities, some educational, some cultural and some simply for the excitement of the experience. The youths complement what is given them with giving of their own — helping on welfare projects benefiting the disadvantaged. The unique feature of this, the fourth project in the series, is that the ground - and air-crews of an Air Force fighter squadron — and in Israel no one commands greater charisma and prestige than Air Force fighter pilots — have volunteered to add their very special contribution. Each is taking the role of elder brother and role model to one of the youths for the four months of the project (March-June 2002). What does the Air Force get out of the project that it is willing to add an extra task onto its pilots' and technicians' already intensively filled schedule? Says the base commander: "Social commitment like this keep the pilots' feet on the ground and makes them better pilots." Says one of the pilots: "The country has invested huge resources in training us. This is how I give some of that back."

The astonishing fact is that in the south of the country a quarter of all juvenile offenses are committed by immigrant youths. The Experience of Friendship projects offer some of them a deal: take this special course, show the right commitment to it and commit no further offenses during the course — and your criminal record will be wiped clean. It is the youth probation officers who select those young offenders likely to benefit from the chance offered them. Seven of the nine youths who started the fourth project took the chance offered them and could resume life with a clean slate.

Other partners recruited by the IP to help out with this fourth project are the Association of Friends of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, who provided university students to conduct workshops in a wide range of subjects, and the Center for Victims of Sexual Assault, who took responsibility for another set of workshops. The Ministry of Absorption and the local authority also made significant contributions.

THE EXPERIENCE OF FRIENDSHIP PROJECT NO. 5 - FOR GIRLS

SUPERINTENDENT AVSHALOM BOSHARI – YOUNG OFFENDERS OFFICER, SOUTHERN DISTRICT, ISRAEL POLICE

Adolescence is usually a time of personal crisis, of swings of mood and behavior between childishness and maturity, of problems in finding one's family and sexual identity. If to complicate that comes the crisis of immigration to a new and very different country and society, then we can understand that some girls will find the wrong road forward. The Experience of Friendship projects are one of the efforts the Israel Police (IP) makes to prevent immigrant youth slipping into a career of crime, and project no. 5 is the first to be designed for girls, in this case, aged 13-14. Youth probation officers select young offenders likely to benefit from the chance offered them and propose a deal: take this special course, show the right commitment to it and commit no further offenses during the period

– and your criminal record will be wiped clean.

The Experience of Friendship project offers the girls friendship and a wide range of activities – educational, cultural and … fun. The young teenagers complement what is given them with giving of their own – helping on welfare projects benefiting the disadvantaged. The key role in this fifth project in the series is assumed by female students from Ben Gurion University. Each takes the role of elder sister, personal tutor and role model to one of the immigrant girls for the eight months of the project (May-December, 2002) and tries not only to show the younger girl a different and more positive way forward through the difficulties of adolescence and absorption in their new society but to give practical, one-on-one assistance and advice.

The project is a highly collaborative effort, which the IP could not have carried out alone. To the aid of the IP have come:

- The Association of Friends of Ben-Gurion University, who provide in addition to the 'tutor-elder sister' students another group of students to conduct workshops in a range of subjects;
- The Center for Victims of Sexual Assault, who assumed responsibility for another set of workshops;
- The Ministry of Absorption's Southern Region office, which gave approval for the project to be replicated in every town in the region;
- The local authority's Education Department, that helped identify at-risk candidates for the project and monitor their educational progress during the period;
- Ben-Gurion University Students Union, which provided some of the enrichment activities for the girls, as well as a daily lunch. Most of the project takes place on the campus of the University.

Corrections

COMMUNITY SERVICE AS PUNISHMENT

COMMANDER MOSHE EZRA – DIRECTOR OF COMMUNITY SERVICE,
ISRAEL PRISON SERVICE

Background

The practice of allowing short prison sentences to be served outside the prison walls in the form of supervised community service goes back, in Israel, to 1927 when Great Britain governed Palestine by Mandate. It was not formally written into the Israeli statute books, however, until 1987, when the Knesset passed the Community Service Law, allowing a judge to order that all or part of a prison sentence not exceeding 6 months shall be served in the form of community service in the public or private sector, in lieu of a term of imprisonment. Since the Act was passed, the number of convicted persons assigned Community Service sentences has risen from 40 in 1987 to 1,600 in 2001.

The Advantages of Community Service Sentences

Avoiding a custodial sentence has advantages for all concerned – the offender, the prison system and the State. From the point of view of the offender, he (or she) is spared the disgrace of prison and the negative influence of the inmates. He can maintain a reasonable family and social life and begin his rehabilitation process at once. From the point of view of the State and its prison system, a patent advantage is the saving in money. Of the 1,600 persons participating in Community Service sentences in 2001, were no such alternative available, some 1,200 would have had to be imprisoned, when the cost of building every single additional cell space is $40,000. To that must be added the maintenance and supervision/ guarding costs – $800 per year for a Community Service sentence as compared to $20,000 for a custodial sentence. Another bonus to the State and society is the substantial contribution made by the work itself that the convicts do in hospitals, old age homes, etc. One may even talk of benefits accruing on the ethical plane, in that a real punishment – conviction and sentence in open court is not a negligible punishment, however one looks at it – is given the positive value of an actual and publicly visible contribution to society; perhaps even the offender's own value-system benefits.

How the System Works

Admission: The admission process begins when the judge, before passing sentence, asks the director of the Israel Prison Service's Community Service Department to assess the suitability of the convicted offender for this form of sentence. The offender is summoned to the Department for interview and assessment of health and employability criteria, and the Department's evaluation is then forwarded to the judge. If the offender has been found suitable, the Director of the Department will add the names of two appropriate workplaces, with a recommendation for one of them. Once the judge has issued his order that the sentence be served in a designated workplace, the Director notifies both the prospective employer and the Department inspector, who will be responsible for supervising the offender as he serves out his sentence (working from 08:00 to 16:00, 5 days a week).

Community Service Prisoners by Type of Offence



Supervision: Under the Community Service Law, an IPS inspector must make a spot check of all convicted persons under his supervision once a week and not less than twice a month. However, since the Department must meet all demands on it with a total nationwide staff of only 12 inspectors and 3 regional coordinators, a substantial part of the supervision responsibility must fall on the employer, who is in daily touch with the offender. For the entire duration of the community sentence, the employer is required to maintain daily oversight of the offender's attendance record, time-keeping, and the manner in which he performs his duties.

Disciplinary Measures: The severest disciplinary measure that can be taken against an uncooperative community service offender (unjustified absences, bad workmanship, arrest, etc.) is to send him to spend the remainder of his sentence behind prison bars. Such a decision can only be taken by the IPS Commissioner and only if the working offender has committed an offense against his terms of employment for which the Penal Code disqualifies him from a non-custodial sentence.

The Employers: The Department works with about 400 employers around the country, all of them either State or public institutions or non-profit organizations serving a public interest, such as hospitals, nursing homes, police and fire stations, municipalities and local government authorities. While the employer makes no payment for the offender's work, neither to the offender himself nor to the Department, most of them reimburse the offender his travel costs and provide him a daily meal. Offenders meeting certain criteria are also entitled to Income Support Benefits from the National Insurance system (guaranteeing a minimum monthly income).

Conclusions

Fourteen years after the Community Service Law came into effect it can be affirmed beyond doubt that it has proved itself extremely beneficial and effective, sparing tens of thousands of convicted offenders the disgrace of imprisonment and sparing the State huge expenditures in prison construction and running costs. The steep rise in the number of offenders serving these non-custodial punishments only goes to emphasize the point. The law's success and the current overcrowding in the prisons have indeed induced the authorities to consider raising the maximum length of sentence which may be served in the form of community service from six to nine months.

OPERATING PRISON GUARD-DOGS IN MALE-FEMALE PAIRS

SUPERINTENDENT DR. NOAM TAVOR – OPERATIONS OFFICER, SERVICE DOGS UNIT,
ISRAEL PRISON SERVICE

Background

Ten Israel Prison Service (IPS) prisons use guard-dogs to patrol their perimeters.* The dogs are allowed an unleashed free run of a fixed range, 50 meters long on average and extending between two fences set about 3 meters apart. On weekdays, the dogs are let out in the evening and brought back to their kennels the next morning, where they rest until the evening. On weekends they patrol day and night without a break. Two-thirds of the 105 ranges into which the ten prison perimeters are divided are patrolled by a male and neutered female pair; the remaining third, by a single male.

Operating Guard-Dogs in Pairs

The formal guideline that now governs the operation of IPS guard-dogs states that weak points on a prison perimeter must be patrolled by two dogs, not one. Our conclusion that the best pairing is a dog and a bitch rests both on well-researched and demonstrated aspects of dog behavior and on aspects less studied but well-known to practicing dog handlers. These are:

- Dogs have a genetically implanted pack instinct.
- A pair will defend a territory they feel belongs to them (as will a single dog also).
- The male of a pair will defend his bitch out of natural possessiveness (high probability).
- The bitch will draw courage from having a male nearby (very high probability).
- Combining a self-confident male with a more timid bitch creates the optimum 'guarding package', for the pairing combines the male's strength and aggression (the male is usually the dominant of the pair) with the bitch's tendency to bark loudly, which is useful for alerting human guards.

Matching the Right Pair

After years of experience in training and testing dogs and observing their performance under operational conditions, we have developed tried and tested methods for matching the right male with the right female. Once

the two partners are located, they have to be successfully introduced to each other and then methodically trained to guard as a team. The training emphasizes the advantage of a pair in dealing with situations when their range is under more than one simultaneous threat. We do not try to pair off two males because of their well-known tendency to fight each other, nor two females, both because of fighting and because they do not look sufficiently threatening (females are generally smaller in size and less aggressive).

The criteria for forming a male-female pair that will perform to the required level:

- At least one of the pair must be of impressive size (usually the male);
- At least one of the pair must be a great barker (usually the female);
- When together, they must remain alert and fierce.
- When together, they must not retreat from a person approaching the fence but act threateningly.
- In action against a threat they must not attack each other (when excited, a wrongly matched pair, who have not settled who is the dominant one, will attack each other);
- They must eat together in their range without trouble.

The success of a pairing is tested by their handlers and other professionals running spot checks of their performance at guarding and securing.

The weakness of the male-female pair method:
A successful match depends on the professionalism, conscientiousness and careful observation of the handler in charge. A handler who pairs off two dogs without due attention to the above-mentioned criteria — particularly the last two — will only damage their ability to function, perhaps irreversibly, as guard-dogs.

The Need for Further Research

The team of handlers who have been using this pairing method for several years now, and in a structured manner for the last two years, are convinced that pairing a male and female — provided that the pairing is done properly, as set out above — creates a 'guarding synergy', that is, the pair guards better than two unmatched individuals. We have observed many cases when the performance of a dog guarding a range alone began to drop off, whether from aging or boredom, but quickly picked up again when the right female was put with him. Older dogs were 'rejuvenated' as though several years had been taken off their age. To verify the claim that pairing creates an increased and intensified activity-level which can be exploited to achieve a

better guarding/securing performance, scientifically controlled experiments need to be conducted, whose variables and outcomes can be measured and statistically analyzed.
The recommended research question for such an experiment would be: Does a male-female pair of dogs perform guard duties better when patrolling a range as a pair than they do when each is patrolling a range singly?

The Necessary Conditions for a Reliable and Valid Experiment

1. The experimental pairing must show no aggression to each other under any circumstances. (Some dogs just do not get along together, especially when excited.)
2. Before testing begins, the dogs must be allowed at least two weeks' gradual adaptation to the range, in order to neutralize the strangeness and threat presented by a new range.
3. During the period of adaptation, the dogs must follow a constant, predictable and uniform routine.
4. As far as possible the dogs should be tested at the same times each day.
5. The judges who will score the dogs must possess the requisite skills to identify a guard-dog's patterns of activity and modes of work, and must be tested for these skills by an expert before experimenting begins.
6. The experiment should test at least 10 pairs of dogs.
7. The experiment should be conducted during a period of stable, relatively temperate weather (not at times of heavy rain or great heat).
8. The dogs' performance should be scored on a specially composed questionnaire.
9. The test should be run several times for each dog or pair of dogs in order to check scoring consistency.

Defining the performance variables to be tested:

- Alertness – How much time elapses before a dog reaches full guarding/securing mode?
- Fierceness – How intensely does the dog perform its duties?
- Tenacity – How long does a dog remain in its guarding/securing mode?

Conclusions

After years of systematic testing and practical experimentation, the heads of the IPS Dogs Unit recommend to all those who make regular use of guard-dogs that they consider the option of operating their dogs in carefully matched male-female pairs, giving due consideration to the physical conditions the dogs work in and other constraints. A second recommendation — and a qualification to the first one — is that scientifically controlled experiments be conducted to verify the claims we have advanced in support of the first recommendation.

The author of this paper would be very glad to exchange information and opinions with anyone interested. Letters should be sent to:

Dr. Noam Tavor
Security Department
Israel Prison Service
P.O. Box 81
Ramle
Israel

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**The IPS gets its dogs as donations from a number of sources: the general public, the Police, the Army, municipal dog pounds, and animal protection societies. Each dog offered the IPS is evaluated on a fixed protocol for age, health (has a valid rabies vaccination certificate, etc.), size, and behavior (fierceness, alertness, tenacity*).

THE ISRAEL PRISON SERVICE WEBSITE

http://www.ips.gov.il

CHIEF INSPECTOR ORIT STELSER – NATIONAL INFORMATION OFFICER
CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT IAN H. DOMNITZ, ADV. – HEAD,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BRANCH
ISRAEL PRISON SERVICE

Recently, the Israel Prison Service (IPS) took its first steps towards establishing a website, utilizing from the beginning the professional services of the Israel Government Advertising Agency. With its launching the IPS joined the global family of correctional and prison services appearing on the web.

The site has been designed in an aesthetic and interesting manner, providing a multitude of information concerning the administration and management of a modern prison service. In addition, prison regulations, directives and orders are published on the site. A brief history of the IPS along with photographs can also be found.

The site provides an up-to-date image of the service, an opportunity to supply the public with reliable and current data, a look at the organizational structure of the IPS and a glimpse at what happens behind the walls.

News of events occurring in the IPS are presented on the site, such as disturbances at Shikma and Eshel Prisons by Palestinian inmates.

Since the site has been launched, a large number of inquiries have been sent to the site's e-mail address relating to IPS policy, living conditions of inmates, opportunities to volunteer to aid prisoners, recruitment information and matters on the public agenda.

The website affords an opportunity for various sectors of the public – citizens, relatives of prisoners, professionals, academics, related agencies and IPS staff – to receive information and answers to their questions.

The site puts a special emphasis on the following subjects:

1. **Prisoner Care and Treatment:** a comprehensive description of the various treatment programs in the areas of drug rehabilitation, domestic violence, and medical and mental health care.

2. **Prisoner Rights and Obligations:** information on the rights and obligations of inmates and vital information concerning visits.

3. **IPS Industries:** outline of all areas of IPS production throughout the country, a catalogue of items manufactured by inmates working within the framework of IPS Industries, and an order form for purchasing the finished products.

4. **Community Projects:** details of the numerous community projects in co-operation with IPS, for example, staff volunteering to help the elderly, and co-operation with local municipalities in order to ensure continuity of treatment after inmate release.

In the future the Israel Prison Service plans to expand the databases appearing on its site, to complete the translation of the text into English, and is considering the translation into other languages such as Arabic and Russian. Also in stages of development are new sections and categories to be included in the future.

An invitation to visit the website can be found in the Statement of the Israel Prison Service Commissioner Orit Adato appearing on the site: Presenting the work done within the walls of the Israel Prison Service reflects our responsibility and commitment, and invites you to become acquainted with and be a part of this important challenge.

THE PRISON SERVICE AND THE COMMUNITY: WORKING TOGETHER

SUPERINTENDENT HANNA NITZAN – DEPUTY SPOKESWOMAN, ISRAEL PRISON SERVICE

Introduction

The Israel Prison Service (IPS) is a security organization with a social mission. A guiding principle is the creation of a continuum of care for the prisoner from the beginning of his sentence until his release and return to the community.

In order to facilitate this process, the IPS runs a range of prison-community projects which

- strengthen the rehabilitation efforts within the prison, by gradually re-introducing the prisoner into the community by means of volunteer or work projects;
- involve the community members in volunteering within the prisons, and especially in assisting the newly-released prisoners in their re-entry into society.

Partnership with Local Government Authorities in Prisoner Rehabilitation

This project began in 2001 in the town of Rishon Letzion, at the initiative of the town's mayor and the IPS Commissioner. It has already been replicated by Haifa, Be'er Sheva, Migdal Ha'emek, and Israel's Druze communities. The idea is that the municipalities work with the IPS to help rehabilitate prisoners from their own towns. Each municipality in the project sits down individually with IPS

managers to decide what its needs are and what it can contribute. The municipality then sets up a steering committee, headed by the mayor or his deputy, to oversee the work of four executive sub-committees. The Absorption Committee devises individual rehabilitation plans for prisoners due for release. The Employment Committee works to persuade employers to offer job opportunities. The Purchasing Committee increases the municipality's orders for the products of IPS workshops, so that more prisoners can be employed and arrive home upon release with some savings in their pockets. Lastly, the contribution of the Culture & Leisure Committee is to offer released prisoners and their families desirable leisure-time activities (e.g. tickets to shows) and to encourage sports teams in the town to take their activities into the local prison.

Public Group Visits to Prisons

IPS facilities are open to visits by interested groups. The IPS is particularly interested in encouraging visits and tours by people in related professions: policemen, judges, academics, Local Government Authority officials, etc. The IPS ensures that a Public Relations Officer is at their disposal for the duration of the visit to answer questions, explain the service structure, and arrange meetings with prisoners. All visitors receive printed explanatory material prepared by the Spokesperson's Office. In 2001 no less than 12,000 persons participated in these group visits.

Projects in Schools

The IPS has two ongoing projects in high schools. In the first, in partnership with the IP, it runs a Criminology and Police Studies course for high-school students, which can be taken all the way to matriculation. The IPS provides lecturers and study materials and arranges for students to visit correctional facilities for young offenders. The aim of the second project (Shalhevet) is to discourage school-age drug taking by sending former addicts to talk to students and explain at first hand exactly what it means to start on the path of drug abuse.

Volunteering

Both prison populations, prisoners and warders, do voluntary work outside the walls and, conversely, volunteers from the public come within the walls to provide a range of services to inmates. An example of the first is a group of 10 prisoners from Ma'asiyahu Prison's Individual Rehabilitation Wing who do regular maintenance work in a nearby recreational forest (pruning trees, clearing paths, etc.). In the second context prison staff repair and

paint old people's homes, do maintenance work in health care facilities, adopt schools for students with special needs, etc. As for the some 100 volunteers who regularly come into the prisons, most of them help prisoners repair the gaps in their education or lead other cultural activity groups.

Prisoners' Families

When a prisoner enters an IPS facility to begin his sentence his family receives a booklet compiled by the Spokesperson's Office, setting out useful information about the prisoner's rights and obligations, about agencies in the IPS and in the community who provide assistance of different kinds, the importance of the family urging the prisoner to undertake therapeutic and educational efforts, etc. A new initiative in this direction is in-service training for warders in giving help and advice to prisoners' family members, in dealing with the difficult incidents and issues arising during family visits, and in the consequences of imprisonment for the family at home.

Community Theater

This very special project has been running now for 16 years. In a recent development, eleven prisoners in the Ayalon facility and eleven community theater students from Tel Aviv University have been engaged for the last seven months in an ongoing process of mutual study and in a mutual demonstration of how the other group appears to them. The natural consequence of such a demonstration is introspection and self-reappraisal. The process has been complicated and emotionally tense but concluded successfully in the staging of a performance illustrating the encounter for a variety of audiences — prisoners' families, academics, volunteers, and others.


Technology and
Equipment

TWO SPECIALIZED KITS FOR TAKING AND COMPARING FINGERPRINTS

SUPERINTENDENT SHIMON AMAR – FIELD SUPPORT UNIT,
DIVISION OF IDENTIFICATION & FORENSIC SCIENCE,
ISRAEL POLICE HQ

A Field Kit for Special Fingerprinting Techniques

In recent years the IP's forensic officers have been called upon to contribute their special skills in their response to multi-casualty incidents, whether the incident be a terrorist attack, road or air accident, or natural disaster. Part of the response demanded by all these conditions is rapid and professional identification of the victims, and one of the recognized and most reliable identification methods is fingerprinting (more applicable in Israel than in other countries because compulsory military service for both sexes puts the fingerprints of so many Israelis on record).

Unfortunately, however, forensic

officers have often found the bodies so damaged by intense heat, blast or prolonged immersion in water as to make the usual inkpad fingerprinting method very difficult — or even impossible — to apply. Knowing that the USA's FBI had developed exceptional expertise in this area, we appealed to them for help. To our benefit, the FBI sent one of their experts to instruct our forensic officers in the special techniques they had devised.

The Field Support Unit then proceeded to develop a portable incident kit using these special techniques and containing all required appliances and materials. The kit has now been issued to several District field units, and is proving its worth in the rapid identification of severely damaged bodies.

A Fingerprint Comparison Field Kit

One of the multi-casualty incidents to which the aid of IP identification experts was summoned was the in-flight collision of two troop-carrying IDF helicopters, which left not a single soldier or crew-member alive. Since every serving IDF soldier has his or her fingerprints on file, a relatively straightforward identification process was anticipated. But when the forensic officers arrived at the holding area where the bodies were gathered it soon proved not straightforward at all. Transferring the identification process normally conducted in the specialized facilities of a forensics laboratory to an unequipped holding area presented only the first of many obstacles. A whole series of makeshift set-ups had to be cobbled together, involving improvised lighting, extension cables, portable lamps, magnifying glasses, envelopes and office supplies, etc., etc. Realizing that the situation was going to repeat itself with future incidents, the Field Support Unit at once set out to put together a portable fingerprint comparison kit comprising every item the expert was likely to need to do his work.

The kit has now been in use some time and is enabling our forensic experts to provide anywhere the same reliable and rapid identification they can achieve in the laboratory.

DEPLOYING THE BASEL SMART CARD AT BORDER CHECKPOINTS

TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, ISRAEL POLICE HEADQUARTERS

The Basel system imprints biometric data on smart cards, which Israel can then issue for use at its border crossing-points at the Palestinian Authority areas, for purposes of identification, oversight and control. The identity of persons passing through the checkpoints is examined automatically, without human intervention.

Special facilities register the biometric data (e.g. fingerprints) on each card and issue it to the correct holder, after which the card remains valid for a period of two years. The Basel network includes all units involved in registering Palestinians' personal data and issuing them Israeli documentation. Such units are found at the Coordinator of Activities in the Territories; the Department for Administration, Coordination and Liaison [with the Palestinian Authority]; in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF); and, geographically, at the Erez crossing point from the Gaza Strip, in Judea and Samaria, and at IDF regional commands.

An automated crossing-point using these cards and operated by IDF Southern Command will be installed at the Magen 12 checkpoint, where Palestinian workers cross from the Gaza Strip to the Erez industrial park. The new smart cards will also come into use at those manned IDF checkpoints that are equipped to handle biometric data and to read and inscribe smart cards. The cards will not replace the IDF's current rules and procedures for checkpoint operations but only supply an additional identification element.

Advantages of Automated Identity Checking:

The two chief goals of the introduction of the new cards are to minimize the amount of time each Palestinian has to spend passing through the battery of security and identity checks at checkpoints, and thus permit a much faster flow of people than at present (to the relief of Palestinians and Israeli soldiers alike), and to do so without any weakening of security. A secondary benefit is that the fingerprints on the cards are also readable by standard, non-Basel equipment and so can be used by the regular police to check the identity of workers residing illegally within Israel's borders.

NO SMOKING GUN

CHIEF INSPECTOR YANIV AVISSAR – DIVISION OF IDENTIFICATION & FORENSIC SCIENCE, ISRAEL POLICE HQ

"Did the suspect use the firearm?" is a question often asked during criminal investigations. In late 1998 two dead bodies were found in a famous hairdresser's apartment in Jerusalem, David Afuta and his girlfriend, the actress Anat Elimelech. The bodies were lying on the floor, heads up and in opposite directions. The first policeman who found the bodies reported that a Colt 45 pistol was near the woman's right hand. Anat was felled by one bullet, and David by two. To make a long story short, the final investigation came to the conclusion that a third person had changed the position of the pistol before the police arrived.

The only clues for this appeared after the forensics came in looking for firearm imprints on the hands. No imprints were found on Anat's hands but clear marks were found on David's hands.

The Division of Identification and Forensic Science (DIFS) of the Israel Police developed a simple chemical method to find firearm impressions on a suspect's hands. By spraying the suspect's hands, only the one who touched the gun will show positive. Iron found on the firearm or any tool's surface, will attach to the hand after touching it. The spray contains a chemical reagent known as PDT plus vitamin C, to produce a typical magenta color in the presence of traces of iron on the hand. The iron and vitamin C will improve the color reaction on the hand. In certain cases very clear marks are obtained, which make it possible to connect the suspect and the specific tool. A bolt on the butt, trigger or any unique iron item might give important information.

Although the spray has been successfully used in some criminal cases, it has not been fully researched. Therefore, the DIFS of the Israel Police is collaborating with Prof. Joseph Almog of the Casali Institute and Prof. Dani Mandler of the Analytical Chemistry Department, both at the Hebrew

University of Jerusalem. Our goal is to improve the understanding of the reaction mechanism.
Three main aspects are being examined:

- First, focusing on the interaction between an iron surface and the palm of the hand. How does the iron attach to the skin? What parameters influence the presence of iron on the palm?
- Second, focusing on the reaction between iron and PDT. What are the optimal conditions? And what are the detection limits?
- Third, investigating the absorption mechanism of iron on the palm skin. How long after the contact will the suspect give a visible sign?

All three directions are not new, yet not much scientific work had been accomplished until now.
Preliminary results indicate a correlation between the development of latent fingerprints and good firearm imprints on the hands. We assume that as the amount of sweat increases, a better magenta mark develops. The firearm's rust and holding duration affects the imprints as well. So far, most questions remain open. However, by collecting enough information from many individuals, we hope to get some answers and improve the detectability of the marks and hence, improve the detective's work where there is "no smoking gun".

PELE - COMPUTERIZING INVESTIGATIONS AND RECORD KEEPING

CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT AMOS BE'ER – TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION,
ISRAEL POLICE HEADQUARTERS



Background

The familiar sight of investigators staggering into court loaded with boxfuls of cardboard files, of detectives busy filling up the pages of their notebooks at a crime-scene, of suspects in an interview room trying to swallow incriminating documents, all this should within a few years be a thing of the past. The Israel Police (IP) Technology Administration has a new vision. Investigators will come into court with no more than one or two hard disks or at most a single lap-top computer, containing the whole body of evidence. Or alternatively the complete investigation file will have been simply E-mailed to the judge's own computer. Interviews of suspects and witnesses will be recorded and managed by special software, capable of retrieving and displaying to interviewers in real time any statistical analysis, graph, map or any other item of processed police data they might require. And all at the touch of a key-board. The plan at present is not to replace the investigator himself but only to spare him days and nights of paper-pushing and other bureaucratic chores.

The history of police investigations is riddled with instances of investigations that have broken down for lack of access to records and evidence stores. Investigators have worn themselves ragged hunting through shelves of paper records and still in the end have been forced to release their suspect after not finding the vital sheet of incriminating paper. Files



containing sensitive information have gone astray and police units have declined to offer each other a helping hand, precisely because of the logistical difficulty of moving evidence files and exhibits around the country.

The Pele Project

The Pele project — a key segment of the ongoing computerization revolution the IP has been pushing forward over the last decade — plans to put these logistical difficulties behind us by computerizing the investigative process from beginning to end and making access to all police-held criminal records available at the click of a computer key. Textual data retrieval by keywords, the GIS system for mapping criminal activity, a range of statistical data analyses, these and other techniques will be deployed to enable police officers to make informed use of the warehouses of printed data and material exhibits the IP holds in storage.

Investigators will arrive at their desks in the morning to find their computer screen displaying the list of tasks for that day in each of the files they are handling. A click of the mouse takes them into whichever file they choose. Instead of having to rummage through sheets of paper divided among tens of files, they click their way from category to category of evidence, organized by the new software — the diary of the investigation, witness statements, suspect interrogations, photos of weapons, vehicles, material samples and exhibits, etc. From their keyboards they can retrieve, reclassify and reconnect information drawn from any file and any IP unit.

A second objective of the project is to use the computerization of IP data to construct a map of criminal activity in Israel, that can be updated day by day and week by week and reduced or enlarged in scale to map crime street by street within a single neighborhood or nationwide across the whole country. The same data can be recategorized to give a picture of the distribution of crime by type of offense or time of year or any other relevant unit of analysis.

This ambitious program is one of a range of projects being developed by the Technology Administration as the Israel Police like its counterparts world-wide participate in the revolution brought about by the computer.

COMPUTERIZING THE ISRAEL POLICE HEALTH CARE TESTING CENTER

TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, ISRAEL POLICE HEADQUARTERS

All Israeli police officers, like police officers everywhere, must undergo regular medical and physical performance checks throughout their career in the force. The IP has recently taken the initiative to computerize the health center that conducts these checks, both to upgrade the performance and increase the output of the center's physicians, paramedics and dieticians, and to improve service to officers by reducing waiting times and the time spent at the center.

The computerization has been designed to upgrade the following functions:

- Storage and retrieval of all individual medical and performance data
- Collating the results from different tests and testing devices
- Advance planning of testing and other activities
- Streamlining each officer's check-up day by setting up separate testing stations for each component battery of tests
- Setting appointments and sending reminders to officers who require follow-ups
- Producing operational and statistical reports.

The computerization project is expected to yield the following benefits:

- Waiting times between tests will be reduced and the overall quality of service improved.
- The center will be able to test more officers in a given day.
- Duplicate data entries from different testing equipment will be eliminated.
- Each officer's complete physical performance history will be centralized and accessible.
- We will have the data-processing infrastructure to compile a medical dossier for each officer and to produce medical reports for individual police officers and their unit medical officers.