

LUNCHEON MEETING

Tel-Aviv
Monday, October 22, 1973
3 p.m.

Participating:

USA:

Dr. Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary
of State

Mr. Joseph Sisco, Asst. Sec'y of
State

Mr. Alfred Atherton

Ambassador K. Keating

Mr. R. McCloskey

Mr. Lord

Mr. Eagleburger

Mr. Rodman

ISRAEL:

Prime Minister Golda Meir

Deputy Prime Minister
Y. Allon

Defense Minister M. Dayan

Foreign Minister A. Eban

Mr. Kidron, Foreign Office

Mr. Evron, Foreign Office

Mr. M. Gazit, Prime
Minister's Office

Mr. Y. Rabin

NOTE: In addition to the recorded conversations, there were separate, simultaneous conversations going on from time to time among the participants, which were inaudible.

DR. KISSINGER: I have to tell the other Israelis here - I have already told the Prime Minister - you have an absolute guarantee in our Ambassador. He has never been on the losing side in a war. You should have seen some of his reactions when we made proposals you didn't agree with. You only made your point once but he wouldn't stop.

MR. ALLON: What you said about your Ambassador, was that supposed to be a compliment?

DR. KISSINGER: I have a certain pleasure because in the Indian-Pakistani war when we said units had returned to the status quo - he sent me the most outraged telegrams, when he was in India. This time I was glad to see he is taking the Pakistani view. (laughter).

MR. EBAN: Have the Indians become reconciled now?

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, yes, we have excellent relations now with India.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Since I left.

MR. EBAN: She was very abrasive.

MRS. MEIR: There you have a nice Prime Minister, no intransigent. She is not stubborn, she always gives in, she never goes to war. Nice woman.

MR. EBAN: She doesn't believe in the acquisition of territory by force.

MR. SISCO : My comment was this - you both win wars.

DR. KISSINGER: All the women prime ministers are in Sisco's area.

MRS. MEIR! That's right, all three of them. How can you take that?

MR. SISCO: I love it. (laughter).

MRS. MEIR: I will never forget, during 1957 Khrishna Menon for hours and hours would preach to us about why we didn't go back. And then they did that trick on Goa. And he came back and at the airport, the newspaper man asked him: What about Goa? He lifted his cane - Goa, that's his, that's different.

(Mrs. Meir toasts Le-Hayim, folbwd by separate conversations among participants)

DR. KISSINGER: Are you going to get some sleep?

MRS. MEIR: I slept for two hours.

DR. KISSINGER: You look very well.

MRS. MEIR: This is psychological warfare against Sadat. We look so well.

MR. EBAN: These long periods with no tension do that.

MRS. MEIR: Last night about 8 o'clock, Mrs. Kedar said to me: Look, everything is quiet. Go home, watch television together with your grandchildren. I said: Okay. And then: boom. I didn't get out of the room until 8:30 this morning.

GEN. DAYAN (referring to message he has been handed):
... that we got from you and from Russia that Sadat announced that he is ready to stop the fire and hostile acts starting with

1700 hours Egyptian time.

DR. KISSINGER: That is the same as yours?

GEN. DAYAN: It's 6 o'clock our time. And he is asking whether Israel is ready to do the same.

DR. KISSINGER: Officially, through us?

GEN. DAYAN: I don't know.

DR. KISSINGER: We have a message that they want an official statement from you. But you make it on your own. We don't have to intermediate for that.

MR. ALLON: Didn't we made an official statement when we published the decision of the Cabinet?

MRS. MEIR: Yes, but that was not in hours.

MR. EBAN: It means containing a time.

MRS. MEIR: All we need now I think is that we have accepted that, and that an order has been sent to the forces.

GEN. DAYAN: I told the Chief of Staff if we get an official communique from the Egyptians or anybody that they accept the cease-fire and if on the ground our forces can see that the do stop, then we stop at the time. So we have to have two announcements; one, a formal announcement that they are accepting the cease fire, and then a practical one to see that they are stopping the fire, and our forces have been notified about that already.

DR. KISSINGER: Did you notify anybody that you have told this to us? We are not asking for it, but should we do it?

MRS. MEIR: That these are the orders that were given, is that it?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not asking. You can do it on your radio.

MRS. MEIR: No, we can let you know.

GEN. DAYAN: This is an order that was given to the forces. Now, the question is have we got an official statement?

DR. KISSINGER: We have an official communication which we have been asked to transmit to you.

GEN. DAYAN: So once we get this communication and you tell me that you say they are going to do it, then I can tell the forces that once we have to do that, we have to anticipate it, and it is about 6 o'clock, and if they really stop firing then we stop too.

MR. EBAN: To use the same channel that they used to transmit it to us would be normal.

DR. KISSINGER: Us? Then, why don't we communicate to them that we have their message and that you are prepared to stop 1800 hours your time, provided their forces actually carry out the orders which have been published on Cairo Radio. Larry, do it now please.

MRS. MEIR: From Syria, it is quiet.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: The Iraqis have said they do not accept it.

MRS. MEIR: Look, you people will have to do something about the difference in time. You don't know what happened. Saper was in the States for about 5 or 6 days, and my military attache, poor man, I don't think he slept for two hours any night. Every night he kept calling him and saying: Tell me what is the news. He didn't sleep much anyhow. And what we do to Simha is terrible. He asked me yesterday if the Secretary will come here can he come, so I said: sure. But then it was too short.

When do you get it in fact? (Referring to Nobel Prize)

DR. KISSINGER: On December 10 in Oslo. The Swedes have not invited me. Normally the winner goes to the cathedral in Stockholm for a prayer service, but they have cancelled that for me. I don't think I'd be the ideal subject for a Lutheran service anyway.

GEN. DAYAN (returning to room): Apparently there is no difference between Egyptian time and Israeli time. That means 1700 hours, but that will be only 11 hours from the Security Council resolution.

MR. EBAN: The resolution said no more than 12 hours.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: I don't wonder the Egyptians want to stop a little quicker.

GEN. DAYAN: What should we do about it? I would rather not stop before the 12 hours are up.

DR. KISSINGER: That is in your domestic jurisdiction. I will be on an airplane.

GEN. DAYAN: And that is only about Egypt. No message from Syria.

DR. KISSINGER: The reason you won this war is because I didn't give you any advice on strategy. I am not going to start on the last day.

MR. EBAN: But you expressed a strong interest in developments.

GEN. DAYAN: I suggest we say that we stop according to the UN resolution.

DR. KISSINGER: Just say you stop at 1800 hours provided - what we are communicating to the Russians is that we have been informed you will stop at 1800 hours provided the Egyptians forces in fact stop firing. And we are also communicating that to the Egyptians. I will tell you one thing, Madame Prime Minister, you get more information than my current colleagues did before I assumed my present position. (laughter).

MRS. MEIR: Is it cold in Moscow?

MR. SISCO: Very cold, very penetrating.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Wet?

MR. SISCO: No. We had a little snow the other day but it cleared down.

MR. ALLON: Maybe they will need some more grain next year.

MRS. MEIR: We say we are subsidizing the Russians.

DR. KISSINGER: How?

MRS. MEIR: By paying more for grain.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, not everything has been shipped yet. Our unions have refused to load because of the Soviet actions in the Middle East.

MR. EBAN: George Meany made some robust comments on the detente.

DR. KISSINGER: It is all right for him to do it. I don't think the detente has worked to Israel's disadvantage.

(referring to message). Cairo Radio, we have been told, President Sadat has given his orders to the armed forces to cease fire at the time specified by the UN Security Council resolution, conditional upon Israel observing the cease fire. So, no problems, exactly the same thing. Will you say this on your radio? It might be a good idea.

MR. EBAN: Did the Security Council give a specific time?

DR. KISSINGER: No, it said no later than 12 hours. I would just give the exact hour.

MR. EBAN: Someone has to fix what the lines and positions are.

MRS. MEIR: Nobody knows who is going to decide where anybody is. What is the line where we have to stop.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Positions as they are.

MRS. MEIR: Who is going to decide the positions?

MR. ALLON: No mechanism has been set up?

DR. KISSINGER: No, but I think we could propose a UN force tomorrow. We could put the UNTSO personell in.

MR. SISCO: It is a question if you want to avoid any formal Security Council proceedings. I would think if one of the other parties got in touch with your Chief of Staff on the ground and ask that he assist in helping to arrange the practical elements of the cease fire, this is the way to do it without getting involved in a lot of these formal proceedings in the UN. My judgement is that he has sufficient mandate.

DR. KISSINGER: Why don't you do it? It may cause one phone call again with Waldheim. You didn't keep him here very long. I am trying to farm him out for two months every year to each country.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: He didn't go over very well here. He wasn't properly briefed.

DR. KISSINGER: In the early stages of the crisis, he called me about three times a day.

(To Mr. Eban) Are you coming back to New York?

MR. EBAN: It depends if there is any ^{thing} useful or necessary for me to do. I am coming anyway in December.

DR. KISSINGER: You will come to Washington for a longer period. I think we have really exemplary contact.

MR. ALLON: When are we starting peace negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we can get started pretty soon. I have talked with the Prime Minister. And this is a firm understanding between us.

MR. ALLON: The Syrians and Egyptians ... vis-a-vis prisoners of war, I don't know why. This is a good chance to get our boys out.

DR. KISSINGER: We have an understanding - we cannot say it publicly - that both sides will use their maximum influence to bring about release of prisoners immediately. We are now using our influence with you to release your prisoners, which you are willing to do. We will inform them of this.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Henry, you know they have not given a list of prisoners.

MR. ALLON: Only a few names.

DR. KISSINGER: When I have my press conference I will say there must be an immediate release of prisoners, exchange of prisoners.

(At this point, several simultaneous conversations take place)

GEN. DAYAN: You see, we more or less told our people we will not agree to a cease fire unless we will get our prisoners.

DR. KISSINGER: I have been given reason to believe that-

GEN. DAYAN: It is all right with us if we get it from you, ^{we} won't ask you-

DR. KISSINGER: Let's say I told you. I don't want to say it flatly - how could we say it? I have told you that we can

expect release of prisoners.

GEN. DAYAN: That there will be an exchange of prisoners.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you see I have been told the Russians will use their influence.

GEN. DAYAN: Well, I am afraid we will be in trouble.

DR. KISSINGER: When I give my press conference, I can express my understanding easily. But what I am trying to avoid is that you speak for me which will produce a negative reaction before I can even say something in America.

GEN. DAYAN: We don't have to mention you. It is enough if we say we have been assured that there will be an early exchange of prisoners, without mentioning your name.

DR. KISSINGER: Won't they ask by whom?

GEN. DAYAN: We are not obliged to answer.

MRS. MEIR: Just a week ago last Tuesday, I made a statement in the Knesset that there will be no cease fire agreement without exchange of prisoners. If I am not in a position to say we have been informed that this will be-

DR. KISSINGER: Can't you say you are confident?

MR. ALLON: But if Henry is making a statement to the press.

DR. KISSINGER: It will be on Wednesday.

GEN. DAYAN: If we order our troops to stop firing without having an assurance that there will be exchange of prisoners we will be in trouble. We will be reproached about why we agreed to stop firing before getting such a promise.

DR. KISSINGER: Can you hold it by saying you have been assured, without saying by whom?

MRS. MEIR: Yes.

GEN. DAYAN: An early exchange of prisoners.

MR. RABIN: When will you be able to say so?

DR. KISSINGER: Wednesday.

MR. RABIN: Can't you say it tomorrow?

DR. KISSINGER: Maybe. I have to talk to McCloskey.

MR. ALLON: If it is tomorrow, then the Prime Minister can quote you.

DR. KISSINGER: That would be the best. Maybe I can get McCloskey to say it tomorrow. Well, you can count on our saying it.

MRS. MEIR: That would be best. They won't forgive us, and they shouldn't.

MR. EBAN: There is a time factor. We would like it to be on the wires before we begin at the Knesset tomorrow. We begin at 3.

MR. KISSINGER: Well, we are sending a message to the Soviets now.

(to Mr. Eban). How would you like to have Allon as a student, Mr. Foreign Minister? It is not conducive to strict discipline.

MR. ALLON: He is against me, because he went to another university.

DR. KISSINGER: The only thing I would need is to have Dayan also as a student. I have had more trouble with Israeli generals.

GEN. DAYAN: Once in six years they are all right.

DR. KISSINGER: We wanted to borrow you for Vietnam,

GEN. DAYAN: I think our maneuvers on the Egyptian front were really ? and very successful, very successful. Today we are getting the best dividends. It is a pity you came too early. Today is the best day. On the Southern part of the Bitter Lake, we are now approaching that area. There is one thing that I am really curious to see, what will happen with the farmers there. They left everything behind. Of course, we didn't destroy anything. If they come back right away they can go on with their normal life there. You have to irrigate there every day and they left behind all the-

MRS. MEIR: You will have open bridges there?

GEN. DAYAN: We are on the other side of the bridges. (laughter). But otherwise, the whole area will dry up.

MR. SISCO: Will the government let them return?

GEN. DAYAN: I don't know.

MR. ALLON: The Egyptian government encouraged the Egyptians to leave all of the Canal Zone after the Six Day War.

GEN. DAYAN: The whole thing will be complicated, the question of how the Egyptians will take this cease fire. Will they really

mean to maintain it, and for a long time, and have normal life, or will they say: no, we don't care about the farmers, we will start going back.

DR. KISSINGER: I can't see the Arabs starting a war so quickly again. It was costly for Israel but it was very rough for them.

GEN. DAYAN: The trouble is, they are 35 million, the Egyptians.

DR. KISSINGER: But it is trained manpower that matters.

GEN. DAYAN: They trained their amor people very quickly. And they have the Algerians, the Iraqis, the Sudanese and what not, all kinds of them. Probably not efficient forces but a lot of them. Even the Kuwaitis and Palestinians were fighting.

DR. KISSINGER: How did they fight, better this time?

GEN. DAYAN: I am sorry to say, yes. And they kept fighting. Even the Palestinians, not only the regular Egyptians forces, the Palestinians that were there along the Bitter Lake. They used Egyptian tanks and they fought quite well.

MRS. MEIR: The army people say that as long as they were going according to the book, it was all right. But if something happened and they had to quickly change, that didn't work anymore.

DR. KISSINGER: The Syrians fought better, didn't they?

GEN. DAYAN: More devoted and fanatic. I don't know whether they were very bright.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: There is a great confusion up there, firing at each other.

GEN. DAYAN: Some of them fought a whole-hearted kind of fanatic Jihad, not professionally well, but emotionally.

DR. KISSINGER: I saw a report yesterday that the Egyptians shot down 11 of their own planes. Did that come from you?

MR. ALLON: They took our credit.

MRS. MEIR: There are rumors that many of the Jordanian tankes were not found by the Iraqis.

MR. EBAN: They were firing in the wrong direction up in the North.

MR. ALLON: I think the Jordianians think it was deliberately done.

GEN. DAYAN: Are you going to contact the UN people again in Jerusalem, the observers?

MR. SISCO: No, we think you ought to do it.

GEN. DAYAN: Do we? Why?

DR. KISSINGER: We have no firm opinion yet on the subject.

MR. EBAN: The question is whether we need any neutralization on the ground or not.

GEN. DAYAN: I am happy without them. Let the Egyptians approach them. They have their officers, their liaison officers. If they want UN staff, let them approach them.

MR. SISCO: Will the Egyptians know whom to contact?

GEN. DAYAN: Yes, they have the liaison officers in Cairo.

MR. SISCO: I meant in terms of your army.

GEN. DAYAN: Then they would approach us. I don't see how they can physically approach us directly, unless they use some embassy or cross the line with a white flag and say they want to establish contact.

MR. RABIN: Can't we use a direct linke between the Israeli army and the Egyptian army for maintaining of the cease fire?

GEN. DAYAN: I suppose we can send an officer or a soldier with a white flag after the fire has stopped and say let's have mutual arrangements, something like that.

MR. SISCO: I mean ^{say I will} send General X to such and such a place, and see what happens.

MRS. MEIR: But how does the message get there?

MR. SISCO: On the radio.

DR. KISSINGER: We will give it some thought and no doubt you will give it some thought.

MR. ALLON: In '48-49 we had direct contact.

GEN. DAYAN: Yes, but it didn't start that way. It developed later on. It started with the UN people.

MR. SISCO: I think they will prefer to contact a representative of the UNTSO, knowing the past history.

GEN. DAYAN: Let's give them a chance and the initiative and see what they do about it.

MR. EBAN: Who took the initiative in '67? I think they did.

GEN. DAYAN: In 1957 we had hardly any contact with Egyptian troops because we had the French and English in between.

MR. EBAN: But in 1967 I think there was the initiative by Bull.

DR. KISSINGER: In 1957, when you advanced, there were no Egyptians?

GEN. DAYAN: Yes, and we took prisoners, but we didn't get as far as the Suez Canal.

MR. ALLON: Because of Anglo-French stupidity.

MRS. MEIR: We pulled back in 1957.

DR. KISSINGER: Your Ambassador hasn't had much sleep either, Madame Prime Minister.

MRS. MEIR: Ours, no. What we did to him!

MR. EBAN: The hours are all wrong.

DR. KISSINGER: When he gets instructions from the Prime Minister he calls immediately even if it's 3 in the morning.

MRS. MEIR: Direct action.

MR. EBAN: Was it 5 or 6 when we got the message on the 6th of October?

DR. KISSINGER: I got it at 6.

MRS. MEIR: 6 in the morning?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. Luckily, all my key people were in New York with me. Joe was up there for the meeting I had with

Dayan² and then with the Foreign Minister on Thursday afternoon. He was helping me with the speech.

MR. EBAN: When you said nothing much would happen until November.

DR. KISSINGER: I said nothing much diplomatic would happen before November. I was trying to reassure you.

GEN. DAYAN: There will be many problems now. For instance, the line. Last time we had a Canal between us, so it was a kind of natural line dividing the forces. Now there is no canal between the forces.

DR. KISSINGER: You know, I had the experience in Vietnam and everyone told us it would be unmanagable and we'd have to get teams out there. And we had endless arguments about whether you can control the zones. It turned out it shook itself out very nicely. Where the forces are you know where they are.

MRS. MEIR: But there was a lot of shooting.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, there was some shooting. Because the Vietcong were trying to grab additional territory. But we had counted on that and they lost a great deal in their efforts.

MR. EBAN: Was that what made the Canadians leave?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, that and the fact that it was really sabotage by the Hungarians and Poles. But our experience in Vietnam is that the physical preponderance area by area determines who controls what, and that took about three or four weeks to establish.

MRS. MEIR: Both on the West and East sides, some places it is mixed up a bit.

GEN. DAYAN: On the East side we are not really touching one another. Where the Egyptians crossed to the other side, our forces are far away a bit. I suppose practically it is the same on the West side. No soldier is touching the one one, but then you have the question of the SAM missiles. If they will start pushing them forward, and I don't know anything about a standstill being promised, so I don't think we shall like that after all the work we did to destroy them, to have them again and have them pushing them forward.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: You have had experience with that already. That is the thing that worries me.

DR. KISSINGER: We didn't think this was something we should attempt to negotiate in Moscow.

MR. ALLON: But it may create a problem, once we begin.

MR. SISCO: No, of course there were no commitments on either side and it may very well create a problem.

GEN. DAYAN: Practically the question is whether they do want to have a real solid cease fire or they don't. If they do, they will be interested too to come to some arrangements.

DR. KISSINGER: More important is whether they want to have real talks, and I do not exclude that now. I mean real talks, not just stating abstract demands. I don't know, I will

have to see what happens in the next few weeks.

MR. EBAN: Real talks means talks that are not public.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think they will start publicly and I have no great hopes for the public talks, but I think the third point of the resolution, which is very clear if you look at the legislative , which I will go over with your ambassador when we get back, there is no question whatsoever that it means direct talks. There was no question about this.

MR. EBAN: Neither in the Soviet minds?

DR. KISSINGER: That's right. What it will mean in the Arab mind I don't know, but since it is indissolubly linked with other provisions, you cannot have implementation of 242 without paragraph 3 which defines what 242 means. And so I think that is going to be an event of great significance, which for 25 years you have sought. Then I believe once that symbolic event is over, then the test will be in the secret talks conducted in many ways.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Do you anticipate that the talks in the first instance will be only between the confrontants?

DR. KISSINGER: That is our expectation, and Jordan probably. It is conceivable to me, for example, that a formal meeting has all of them, and then breaks up with each one. I think once we get the progress started, there are possibilities. As I said to your Foreign Minister in New York, and I want to repeat, we are

not going to float an American plan. That is not our policy and that is not my method, insofar as we get involved in this at all. First, one has to crystallize what the issues are. And I have been telling, as Joe knows, every Arab minister, when he said: Are you going to use your influence with Israel? I say: First you have to give us something on which we are going to use our influence. Until you do that, there is nothing to use our influence about. And that will continue to be our basic approach. We will not have a process where we are going to be shot at by all sides because we have the solution and no one else is willing to agree. But I think the beginning of the process will be an historic event, even if it totally stalemates, which I expect, frankly.

MR. ALLON: By the inclusion about the 242 resolution, we won't see again a Dr. Jarring around? I say a Dr. Jarring, maybe himself, or someone else. I don't think it is good.

DR. KISSINGER: This is not our idea of how it might work.

MRS. MEIR: I think Ambassador said yesterday that the 242 resolution is linked to the 3.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we do not think Jarring or the Secretary General are the appropriate auspices for these talks.

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