

PRELIMINARY

FIVE WHY INVESTIGATION

GALLEY GREASE FIRE

Facility (Leviathan/Tamar/AOT):	Leviathan	Operator Name:	NBL
Doc Number:	LPP-OP-NEM-OPS-RPT-0058	TAG Number:	[תיג]
Start Date:	October-17-2020	End Date:	October-17-2020
Start Time:	[מידע המהווה סוד מסחרי]	End Time:	[מידע המהווה סוד מסחרי]
Total Duration of Event [hh:mm]:	[מידע המהווה סוד מסחרי]		
Describe the failure	On Saturday, October 17, 2020 at [סוד מסחרי] the galley staff for the Leviathan Production Platform were preparing evening meals for the LPP crew. While conducting meal preparations, a new cook left an empty metal pot on the stove unattended with the heat turned on. At approximately [סוד מסחרי], the cook returned to the metal pot on the stove and added 1L of ambient temperature cooking oil. This caused the oil to ignite in the pot and started an incipient fire. The camp boss immediately evacuated all personnel from the galley and attempted to locate a fire blanket. The camp boss was unable to locate a fire blanket and instead attempted to operate the fire suppression system in the galley. However, the fire had not reached sufficient temperature to automatically trigger the [רכיבים על האסדה] and the camp boss was not familiar with manual operation of the system. The camp boss located the nearest [רכיבים על האסדה], but opted not to use the [רכיבים על האסדה] due to risk of displacing the oil and spreading the fire. An announcement to the platform using the [רכיבים על האסדה] was made that a fire had started in the galley in the living quarters. At [סוד מסחרי] the camp boss used a fire alarm hand station [מספר תיוג] located in stairway [רכיב] near the exit door to the lifeboats to trigger a confirmed fire alarm in the living quarters [מספר תיוג]. Per Cause & Effects, this initiated a fire and gas alarm, cut [רכיבים על האסדה] via shunt trip, closed fire dampers, and started the fire water pumps. Also, per Cause & Effects, a confirmed fire alarm in the living quarters initiated an [רכיב] of the platform at [סוד מסחרי]. At [סוד מסחרי] the LPP OIM made an announcement to proceed to secondary muster location [צויד על האסדה] and that this was not a drill. At [סוד מסחרי] the wells were confirmed shut in.		

	At [סוד מסתרי] a response team was dispatched. Two team members proceeded to sweep the living quarters and two additional team members responded to the fire in the galley. The response team confirmed the fire was present, reported a confirmed fire to the team lead, and proceeded to extinguish the fire. The response team removed the flaming pot from the stove. The response team also isolated the stove, ensuring the area had been de-energized. At [סוד מסתרי] the muster officer confirmed a full muster at the secondary muster location. At [סוד מסתרי], a second response team confirmed the fire was extinguished in the galley and OIM was notified that the area was secure. The second response team proceeded to ventilate the galley. At [סוד מסתרי], the LPP topsides were completely blown down. At [סוד מסתרי] the [רכיב] breaker for the emergency power generators was closed. Power and ventilation for the [רכיב] was restored. Fire dampers were returned to service. At [סוד מסתרי] the OIM stood down the muster and convened all personnel in the dining hall with access to the galley isolated.
Describe any bodily injuries	<i>None</i>
Describe any property damage	<i>None</i>
Describe any reduction or interruption in production	[סוד מסתרי]
Corrective Work Order:	<i>None</i>
Expected Return to Work (Production/Drilling/Infrastructure):	<i>N/A</i>
Technician Name:	[שם עובד חברה]

In Case of Flaring (See LPP-OP-NEM-OPS-RPT-0059 for Flaring Details)			
HP Flare		LP Flare	
Volume of gas sent to flare [mmscf]	Duration [minutes]	Volume of Gas sent to flare [mmscf]	Duration [minutes]
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Other Potential Environmental Impacts	
Discharge Quantity	<i>None</i>
Hydrocarbon Spill Quantity	<i>None</i>
Hazardous Material Spill Quantity	<i>None</i>

	Root Cause/ Five Why	Notes/Comments
Galley Grease Fire & [רכיב]		
Why 1	Why was there an incipient grease fire in the galley?	While preparing a dish, a cook in the galley left a metal pot on the stove unattended for about 20 minutes. Upon returning to the empty metal pot, the member of the galley staff added room temperature cooking oil to the pot which initiated a grease fire.
Why 2	Why did the cook add room temperature oil to a hot metal pot?	The member of the galley staff performing the task did not understand the risks associated with the activity because he was new to the facility, this task and offshore safety culture.
Why 3	Why was the galley staff not familiar with this task and offshore safety culture?	The galley staff was new to the facility following an MoE requirement to immediately nationalize the galley crew. The crew did not receive sufficient training prior to mobilization offshore.
Why 4	Why did the galley crew not receive sufficient training prior to mobilization offshore?	Additional investigation is required to determine vendor onboarding, training, and competency programs for new personnel.

Short Term Actions:			
1.	Ensure appropriate fire control and extinguishing materials are present within the galley (e.g. fire blankets).		
	Action Party:	Maintenance Foreman	Due Date: Oct-30-2020
2.	Evaluate training given to all galley staff regarding firefighting systems in galley.		
	Action Party:	OIM	Due Date: Oct-30-2020
3.	Evaluate vendor training on safe procedures and protocols when working offshore.		
	Action Party:	Asset Services Team	Due Date: Oct-30-2020
4.			
	Action Party:		Due Date:

NOTE: To be completed by Supervisor

Proposed Action to Prevent Recurrence:				
Options	Instruction	Required (Y/N)	Reference Number	
Investigate	Conduct in-house incident investigation by EHS Team.	Y		
Initiate Change				
Change Operational Procedure/Instructions				
Other				
Supervisor/Operator Name:	[שם עובד חברה]		Date:	Oct-18-2020

Personnel Involved in Completing Investigation			
Crew Member	Position		
[שם עובד חברה]	[שם עובד חברה]		
[שם עובד חברה]	[שם עובד חברה]		
Author of Report:	[שם עובד חברה]	Date:	Oct-18-2020
Approver of Report:	[שם עובד חברה]	Date:	Oct-18-2020
Contact Info.:			



Figure 1 (above) shows the metal pot following the grease fire.



Figure 2 (above) shows overhead fire suppression system.



Figure 3 (above) shows the CO2 extinguisher next to the stove.



Figure 4 (above) shows [תיוג ציוד על האסדה] following activation.

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